4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
478.
The points in
the draft Introduction included:
•
Iraq
continued to claim that it had “no chemical, biological or nuclear
weapons.
We are
therefore taking the important step of publishing further
information
from
Government intelligence reports about Iraq’s weapons. This shows
there
is no doubt
that Iraq has dangerous chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons
programmes.”
•
The concern
was “heightened” by Saddam Hussein’s previous use of
“these
horrific
weapons”. That made him, and the threat he posed,
“unique”.
•
Saddam
Hussein would “use these weapons again in pursuit of his aim
of
regional
domination and against the West if he thinks he can get away with
it”.
•
“Doing
nothing about this threat” was “not an option”.
•
That was
why the Government was “devoting immense diplomatic energy
to
pressing
Iraq to comply with UN resolutions to destroy its weapons”,
including
giving “UN
weapons inspectors full and unfettered access”.
•
The
Government was “serious about wanting to resolve this issue
through
compliance
with UN resolutions …”
479.
The key points
identified in the FCO briefing paper included statements
that:
•
The Iraqi
regime was “a demonstrable threat to the stability of the region as
a
result of
its continued development of weapons of mass
destruction”.
•
The onus of
complying with UN resolutions was on Saddam Hussein: “If
Iraq
poses no
threat, why does he continue to refuse access to UN
inspectors?”
480.
Sending the
email and FCO briefing paper to Mr McKane, Dr Tanfield
wrote:
“I would
like you to see this now because I am not convinced that
NPD
[Non‑Proliferation
Department] is giving DIS/AS [Assessments Staff] a
sufficiently
hard time
even after all the problems we have already had. May be necessary
to
bang heads
together at next meeting!”210
481.
An Assessment
of regional attitudes towards Iraq and an evaluation of “the
regional
reactions
so far to the prospects of a US-led attack on Iraq”, produced at
the request of
the JIC,
was issued on 19 April (see Section 3.3).211
482.
The Assessment
did not examine Iraq’s WMD capabilities but, in a
concluding
paragraph
entitled “Making the
case”, it
stated:
“For
governments expected to support a US-led attack, the justification
and
evidence will
be crucial in managing their public presentation. Given that
we
judge Iraq
had no responsibility for, or foreknowledge of, the 11 September
terrorist
attacks,
Iraq’s neighbours are likely to demand stronger proof of Iraq’s
development
210
Email
Tanfield to McKane, 15 April 2002, ‘Iraq Dossier’.
211
JIC
Assessment, 19 April 2002, ‘Iraq: Regional Attitudes’.
99