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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
campaign through Package 3, we would be under less pressure to finance a share of the
post-conflict reconstruction effort”.
709.  Mr Blair decided that the MOD should tell the US that the UK was prepared to “put
Package 3 on the same basis as Package 2 for planning purposes, in order to keep the
option open”.
710.  Asked why there might have been a reluctance in government during September
and October to go beyond Package 2, Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry that one reason
was:
“… the lack of clarity of the overall plans still at that point. I think the Chiefs of
Staff were very assiduous throughout this period of always asking whether, in the
discussions with the United States … the US had ‘a winning concept’.
“… [U]nless and until the Chiefs of Staff were satisfied there was a winning
concept – and remember, we were talking about aftermath or the day after as well
as the actual operation itself - then obviously there was a reservation.”353
711.  The shift in UK military focus from northern to southern Iraq, and changes in the
attitude of the Chiefs of Staff to the desirability of a significant UK military contribution to
Phase IV early in 2003 are addressed in Section 6.2.
Growing concern about post-conflict planning
712.  Between October and December 2002, UK officials expressed growing
concern about the slow progress of post-conflict planning.
DFID CONTACT WITH THE US AND UN
713.  By early October, restrictions on contacts with the US and UN were
constraining DFID’s ability to plan effectively.
714.  After a visit to the US by Mr Chakrabarti in late September to discuss
humanitarian planning, Ms Short stopped further contact between DFID and
US officials, concerned about the potential political implications of DFID being
seen to prepare for war.
715.  DFID was also under instruction from the Cabinet Office not to discuss
humanitarian issues with the UN system.
716.  Those restrictions had been lifted by the beginning of November.
717.  The DFID draft paper on humanitarian consequences of military action discussed
by the AHGI on 11 October explained that planning was constrained by the shortage of
353  Public hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 42-43.
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