6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
regime
change in Iraq they will not walk away from that either. I simply
emphasise
this point.
Of course all sorts of issues will have to be resolved, but the
fact is, as I
said a few
weeks ago, that the first decision we must make is this: do we
allow the
situation
to continue, with this weapons of mass destruction
programme?”265
485.
In response to
a question from Mr Jon Owen Jones (Labour) about what
threats
would ensue
if the Iraqi regime were replaced by force of arms, Mr Blair
stated:
“Although
some of these questions – if we get to the stage of regime
change,
what
replaces Saddam – do not arise for decision now, as I have said
throughout
I of course
agree that they are very serious questions, which we need to look
at.
The only
thing that I would say to my honourable Friend about regime change
is
that it is
hard to think of an Iraqi regime that would be worse than Saddam,
but that
said, it is
obviously important that we deal with all these issues, including
making it
quite clear
to the people of Iraq that should it come to the point of regime
change,
that has to
be done while protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq. That is
an
486.
Mr Bruce
George (Labour) proposed a number of criteria to be satisfied
before any
decision
was taken on whether to go to war, including: “a credible military
strategy with
considerable
thought given to what the consequences would be if war were
undertaken
and strong
consideration given to post-operation peace
support”.267
487.
Ms Glenda
Jackson (Labour) and Mr Doug Henderson (Labour) both warned
that,
although
the US and UK were certain to win a war in Iraq, there was no such
certainty
about who
would win the peace.
488.
Ms Jackson
asked whether the UK was ready to commit itself to “a
massive
commitment
of money, materials and personnel to bring about
change”.268
489.
Mr Henderson
warned: “If we do not start with a coalition of public support, it
will be
impossible
to build any stable society in Iraq and neighbouring countries
afterwards.”269
490.
Several
speakers raised post-conflict issues in the House of
Lords.
491.
Lord
Strathclyde (Conservative), in expressing support for the
Government’s
position on
Iraq, asked, among other questions:
“What
vision do the Government have of a post-Saddam Iraq, which is
surely in itself
the most
important question for those who want regime
change?”270
265
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 12.
266
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 20.
267
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, columns 47-48.
268
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 96.
269
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 112.
270
House of
Lords, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 865.
193