The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
116.
The second
report concluded:
“… any
‘regime insider’ succeeding Saddam would find the functional roles
of the
Party
indispensable in administering the state and controlling the
populace. One
can
therefore assume that, unless a fundamental political change
accompanies the
succession
to Saddam, the Ba’ath Party will continue in its present role. Were
a
figure
outside the inner circle of the regime to take power (such as a
senior military
officer),
the future of the party would be open to question.”
117.
The paper
provided details of eight ranks in the Ba’ath Party. The three
most
senior, in
ascending order, were: Udw
Firqa (Division
Leader); Udw
Shu’ba (Section
Leader);
and Udw
Fara’ (Branch
Leader). Party membership was estimated at between
600,000 and
700,000, four percent of the Iraqi population.
118.
The earliest
UK consideration of options for dealing with the Ba’ath Party in a
post-
Saddam
Hussein Iraq seen by the Inquiry appeared in an MOD paper on UK
military
strategic
thinking in mid-June 2002, described later in this
Section.
119.
The DIS papers
on infrastructure and the Ba’ath Party were included in Mr
Blair’s
summer
reading pack at the end of July.
120.
Much of the
material in the infrastructure paper was incorporated into a DIS
report
on Basra in
March 2003 (see Section 6.5).
121.
In January
2002, the British Embassy Amman reported on the economic
situation
in Iraq,
drawing on a seven-day visit to Iraq by an Embassy junior
official.79
Changes
to
the
Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme had led to improvements to Baghdad’s
infrastructure
and the
provision of some essential services, although “underlying poverty”
remained
and power
cuts continued. There were signs that the private sector was
picking up.
A “free
market” was well established in the public sector: a nurse
receiving only
US$3 a month
from the Iraqi government might expect to earn US$250 a month
by
charging
patients. The situation was very different outside Baghdad, where
the standard
of living
in the countryside did not seem to be improving: “Many people,
particularly in
the south,
are dependent on the monthly ration.”
122.
In separate
reports on Iraqi politics, religion and society, the official
reported that:
•
Unemployment
in Iraq was believed to be more than 25 percent and
underemployment
affected almost half the population.80
•
The Iraqi
Christian community was concerned that it risked marginalisation,
with
some senior
figures worrying about what would happen to their community if
the
current
Iraqi regime fell or changed.
79
Telegram 21
Amman to FCO London, 24 January 2002, ‘Iraq:
Economic’.
80
Teleletter
Amman [junior official] to MED [junior official], 24 January 2002,
‘Iraq: Religion/Society’.
134