The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1029.
Mr Blair
also stated that the UN should be seen to give overall
authorisation,
but
it could certainly not run everything. He wanted the UN
Security Council to remain
seized of
the Iraqi issue.
1030.
The record of
the discussion was to be shown only to Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon and
their
Principal Private Secretaries.
1031.
The Azores
‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ incorporated
many
elements of
earlier UK drafts, but the wording on democracy, terrorism and
the
nature of
the Iraqi threat to the world reflected US priorities.
1032.
The ‘Vision
for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ issued by Mr Blair, President
Bush
and Prime
Minister Aznar at the Summit on 16 March is described in more
detail in
Section
3.8. It adopted a more oratorical tone than the UK text, but shared
much of the
substance.438
Key
differences included:
•
the
omission of any explicit reference to oil;
•
insertion
of a reference to terrorism (“We will fight terrorism in all its
forms.
Iraq must
never again be a haven for terrorists of any kind”);
•
insertion
of a reference to democracy (“We will support the Iraqi
people’s
aspirations
for representative government that upholds human rights and
the
rule of law
as cornerstones of democracy”); and
•
insertion
of named references to Iraq’s constituent peoples (Iraq’s “rich
mix
of Sunni
and Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and
all
others”).
1033.
On
post-conflict reconstruction, the three leaders
declared:
“We will
work to prevent and repair damage by Saddam Hussein’s regime to
the
natural
resources of Iraq and pledge to protect them as a national asset of
and
for the
Iraqi people. All Iraqis should share the wealth generated by their
national
economy
…
“In
achieving this vision, we plan to work in close partnership with
international
institutions,
including the United Nations … If conflict occurs, we plan to seek
the
adoption,
on an urgent basis, of new United Nations Security Council
resolutions
that would
affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of
humanitarian
relief, and
endorse an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. We
will also
propose
that the Secretary-General be given authority, on an interim basis,
to ensure
that the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people continue to be met through
the
Oil‑for-Food
program.
438
Statement
of the Atlantic Summit, 16 March 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the
Iraqi People’.
496