The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

124. Mr Scarlett’s other comments included the observations that:

• There seemed to be “an inconsistency in Iraq’s policy towards inspectors.

The [intelligence] indicates the regime plans to let the inspectors into any site.

But it also indicates that the regime must rethink a core WMD capability.”

• It was “possible” that Iraq was “so confident of its concealment strategy that

it believes inspectors will not discover prohibited activity. Nonetheless, this

[intelligence] is important in that it further confirms that ultimately the Iraqi

regime does not envisage having to accept genuine and complete disarmament,

and is confident in its ability to mislead inspectors”.

125. The intelligence described by Mr Scarlett was based on reported comments,

including from someone with access to senior members of the Iraqi regime; but it

was not quoting Saddam Hussein’s views.

126. Mr Campbell wrote in his diaries:

“There was some interesting stuff around on deception programmes, for example

[Iraqi] officials being forced to put papers and materials in their homes with the

warning that they and their families would be harmed if they were lost.”39

127. The Assessments Staff Intelligence Update on 26 November stated that

intelligence indicated Saddam Hussein was personally handling all dealings with

UNMOVIC; and he was confident the inspectors would not find anything, nor find

grounds for claiming Iraq had obstructed its work.40

128. The Update was summarising intelligence from a reliable source quoting Saddam

Hussein’s own views second hand. The intelligence reported that Saddam had made

clear UNMOVIC was to be given no grounds for claiming that inspections were being

obstructed; not that he was confident that the inspectors would not find grounds for

claiming that they were being obstructed.

129. Mr Blair was advised to tell Dr Blix in a meeting on 22 November that there

was a need for UNMOVIC to “bolster its credibility with some in the US”; and that

UNMOVIC should make full use of the powers resolution 1441 had provided.

130. Dr Blix told Mr Blair that Iraq’s tactics seemed to be co‑operation on practical

arrangements but no real change in their approach.

131. Mr Blair said inspections should not be a game of hide and seek, and that

one of the reasons for strong action on Iraq was to deter others.

39 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

40 Minute [Assessments Staff Intelligence Update], 26 November 2002, ‘Iraq – 26 November 2002’.

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