9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
to lack a
clear strategic aim for Iraq. Recovered documentation linked to
al-Zarqawi
lists
Americans, Kurds, Iraqi security forces and Shia as main targets
…
“Most
Islamist extremists identified in intelligence are from outside
Iraq, although
some Iraqis
are involved with these foreign extremist groups.”
810.
In its ‘Key
Judgements’ the JIC found that:
“The scale
of the Islamist extremist presence in Iraq is not known. Nor is the
level
of their
local support. But the radical Islamist ideology of the mujahidin
may be
attractive
to an increasing number of Iraqis.
“Islamist
extremists have probably been responsible for a number of the
most
significant
carefully targeted attacks, causing mass, mainly Iraqi,
casualties.
“The degree
of co-ordination between Islamist groups is not clear. Senior
AQ
associate
al-Zarqawi, appears to be the most important terrorist leader in
Iraq,
but there
is no evidence of a comprehensive co-ordination
structure.
“Al Qaida
has been trying to build up its limited operational presence in
Iraq for some
months, but
Bin Laden’s main focus is likely to remain
Afghanistan.”
811.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock called on Mr Blair in London on 11
March.448
Although
he
thought the
TAL a road map for a successful political transition he predicted
that:
“… the
political situation would remain fluid and unstable over the next
couple of
years,
until fully constitutional elections.”
812.
At Cabinet on
11 March Mr Straw described agreeing the TAL as “an
historic
813.
Writing to Sir
Nigel Sheinwald following the 12 March meeting of the Iraq
Strategy
Group
(ISG), a Cabinet Office official recorded the ISG’s view
that:
“Agreeing
the TAL had been an achievement but we now needed to move on
to
formation
of the interim Government. For this we needed Brahimi and the UN to
help
broker a
solution and bring international legitimacy. Without direct UN
involvement,
it would be
much more difficult to deliver an UNSCR endorsing the
interim
814.
The ISG
believed that the US and UK were agreed in principle on the need
for a
letter of
invitation from the GC authorising a security presence after the
handover to Iraqi
sovereignty
on 30 June. The ISG suggested, however, that the US was less wedded
to
this
approach than the UK and “other more legalistic Coalition
members”.
448
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 11 March 2004, ‘Iraq: Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s Call
on the Prime Minister’.
449
Cabinet
Conclusions, 11 March 2004.
450
Letter Dodd
to Sheinwald, 15 March 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.
339