The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
311.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lord Boyce echoed AM Burridge’s criticism
of
DFID.173
Lord Boyce
described DFID as “particularly un-co-operative, particularly as
led
by Clare
Short”. He told the Inquiry:
“… you had
people on the ground who were excellent operators for DFID,
who
were told
to sit in a tent and not do anything because that’s the instruction
they had
received
and I actually met them.”
312.
Lord Boyce
also told the Inquiry that the UK military “had hoped DFID would
be
showing up
in force” to work alongside Major General Robin Brims, General
Officer
Commanding
(GOC) 1 (UK) Div.174
313.
In response to
a question about the steps taken by the MOD to ensure
that
sufficient
civilian capacity would be available, Lord Boyce told the
Inquiry:
“I don’t
know is the short answer … [T]his is an area … where there was
a
breakdown,
because … we didn’t get the introduction of civilian aid in the
way
that we
actually expected it, and General Brims who did have a DFID officer
in his
headquarters,
and to whom I spoke on the ground in Iraq after the invasion or
during
the
invasion, was frustrated by the fact that … the person was not
getting the sort of
support
from head office that they were expecting and I know that General
Brims felt
314.
Gen Brims, who
left Basra in May 2003, told the Inquiry that, although the
DFID
adviser in
his headquarters reported back to DFID as Phase IV
began:
“I didn’t
see a result coming back … I don’t think during my time in Basra I
received
any UK
finance to help the reconstruction at that stage. I think that the
initial finance
to help the
reconstruction all came from Baghdad, ie it was American or it was
Iraqi
money from
Baghdad coming down, for example, to pay
policemen.”176
315.
Gen Brims said
that what he “really needed” in his headquarters was a
Consul
General and
“some people with experience of running large
cities”.177
316.
Sir Suma
Chakrabarti told the Inquiry that there had been “absolutely
no
instruction …
for anyone to sit in their tents and do nothing”.178
He had
spoken to the
DFID
advisers concerned, who had said that they had not told anyone that
they had
been
instructed to sit in their tents and do nothing. Sir Suma suggested
that Lord
Boyce’s
criticism related to the poor personal relationship between Lord
Boyce and
Clare
Short.
173
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 105.
174
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 83.
175
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 84.
176
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 43.
177
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 35-36.
178
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 38-41.
58