The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

possibility of a land “Task Force” should be more heavily caveated as Mr Hoon remained

“of the view that we should not offer now more than we are certain we can deliver”.242

Mr Hoon also asked for a reference to be included to the fact that a land task force

would “lend itself to involving other countries should they so wish”. He would consider

the text again the following day.

604. On 6 September, Mr Watkins wrote to Sir David Manning, providing an update

on US military planning and “the factors informing decisions on any UK military

contribution”.243 He cautioned that the MOD’s assessment was “necessarily provisional”,

partly because the US plan was still evolving, and partly because there had not yet been

“detailed joint planning with the US”.

605. The MOD had identified three options ranging from minimum to maximum effort.

That included a further revision of the impact of Op FRESCO, which meant that:

“Were we to throw in everything we are likely to have, the UK could potentially

generate up to a divisional headquarters, an armoured brigade, 16 Air Assault

Brigade and a logistic brigade”.

606. The MOD was also “examining whether a Royal Marine Commando Group could

form part of Package 2 [the air and maritime forces packages]”.

607. A land task force would “offer significant capability to a US‑led northern force,

although it would not be fully suitable for involvement in decisive war‑fighting

operations”. It would also require switching units assigned to Op FRESCO training, and

visible activity such as the call‑out of “hundreds of key Reservist personnel”. A decision

to commit all those elements (some 40,000 personnel, of whom 10,000 could be

Reservists) would have “wide‑ranging downstream consequences”.

608. The MOD cautioned “against betting the whole store in this way on one operation”,

and urged continued caution in discussing “the scale of UK’s ability to contribute military

capability”.

609. Mr Watkins stated that, “even were [Op] FRESCO to end soon, we could not

provide a self‑standing division within US timescales” of having an offensive capability

in place in the Gulf by December/January. He continued:

“There would simply not be enough time to carry out the preparations we would

need to make. We would not have enough time to engage industry in order to

improve sustainability (ammunition, etc) and implement UORs to optimise forces

for the theatre and interoperability with the US.”

242 Minute Watkins to DG Op Pol, 5 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Update for the Prime Minister’.

243 Letter Watkins to Manning, 6 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

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