The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• The “biggest source of friction” between the military and UK police officers had

been the inconsistent restrictions on movements but “significant progress” had

been made during his visit to harmonise these, both operating on the basis of

military risk assessments (subject to FCO and ACPO confirmation).933

1009. Sir Ronnie visited Iraq again from 3 to 8 January 2006 and submitted his final

report on 31 January.934

1010. Sir Ronnie wrote that the original terms of reference had evolved into three

overarching issues:

“• The strategic direction and integration of the SSR (policing) effort;

• The efficiency and effectiveness of the SSR (policing) effort, including the

Carabinieri, in MND(SE);

• The effectiveness of the existing training arrangements.”

1011. Sir Ronnie was “encouraged” to learn that since his previous visit “a broad

strategic plan” was now being prepared and that the “disconnect” he had identified

was “already becoming a thing of the past”. In MND(SE), he noted “a high level of

co‑operation” between UK police officers and that SSR now accounted for 47 percent of

the military’s work. He added:

“Nevertheless tensions, both in theatre and within Whitehall, still exist over where

primacy for SSR (policing) effort rests. Put simply, the shift in thinking that should

have followed the assumption by MOD of primacy for SSR in Iraq has not permeated

all activity.”

1012. Sir Ronnie made 17 recommendations, including:

• The Iraqis should be encouraged to develop a robust vetting system for IPS

recruits as soon as possible and to take immediate action to “root out” corrupt

and sub‑standard elements within the IPS. In progressing this the UK will need

to provide support and expert guidance.

• The UK should encourage MNF‑I to transfer responsibility for criminal and

counter‑insurgency intelligence to CPATT.

• For Iraq and future deployments, a senior police officer of Chief Superintendent

rank should be embedded within PJHQ.

• The US and UK should use whatever influence is available to them to ensure

that the next Minister of the Interior has a sound appreciation of the scale of the

challenges and, moreover, is willing to take decisive action to address them.

933 Report Flanagan, 13 December 2005, ‘Interim Report on Policing in Iraq’.

934 Report Flanagan, 31 January 2006, ‘An Assessment of the UK’s Contribution to Security Sector Reform

(Policing) in Iraq’.

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