The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
620.
After the
meeting (at which Mr Alexander’s request for a briefing on
discussions
with JAM1
was to be answered), Sir John Scarlett’s Private Secretary produced
a
summary of
his account of the meeting.288
621.
According to
the summary, Mr Miliband said that:
“… there
was a need to send clear political instructions about the
parameters within
which
negotiations could be conducted, but he offered nothing concrete on
FCO
action in
relation to broadening the process”.
622.
Mr Alexander
had expressed concerns about development projects agreed
with
JAM1
drawing resources and expertise away from existing projects. There
was general
support for
resource decisions to be taken in theatre where conflicts arose
between
priorities.
623.
The account
recorded Sir John’s sense that:
“… there
was a general consensus that [Mr Miliband] should approve the
[NAME OF
OPERATION]
submission and that MOD should press ahead with a
mid-December
release
date for [JAM1]. But the shortening of the meeting meant that there
was not
time to
agree a detailed plan of action.”
However,
there had been “clear interest and support from the PM” which would
help in
agreeing a
detailed plan.
624.
Mr Brown
“touched very briefly” on Iraq during a telephone conversation
with
President
Bush on 20 November.289
He reported
that the UK was making progress on
its political
and economic priorities in the South and still hoped to move to PIC
in Basra
on 17
December.
625.
Government
officials working closely with the military met JAM1 again
on
21 November.290
As agreed
by the Reconciliation Steering Group, their objectives
for the
meeting were to brief JAM1 on the forthcoming release of eight
detainees; to
discuss the
draft agreement that must precede his own release; to explain the
previous
weekend’s media
coverage of the GOC’s press conference in Baghdad; and to
discuss
post-release
contact.
626.
The officials
reminded JAM1 that he would not be released until an
agreement
that marked
an end to hostilities in Basra province had been completed. JAM1
agreed
in
principle but “asked, a little pointedly, what forum could bring
together all significant
leaders in
Basra to sign such an agreement”. They explained that the UK was
continuing
to discuss
the options with local politicians and security
officials.
288
Minute
PS/C, 21 November 2007, ‘NSID (IRAQ) 20 Nov 2007’.
289
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 20 November 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s telephone
call with US President,
20 November’.
290
Email
government official working closely with the military, 22 November
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Meeting with [JAM1] – 21 November’.
298