The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Without
confirmation of Turkey’s support, the UK would “need to
continue
planning
for a southern option as well”. The roles envisaged in the South
were
“worthwhile
but less high profile” and there was an “implicit … risk of the
UK
engagement
in operations in Baghdad” in two of the three options.
1050.
The Chiefs of
Staff were asked to indicate which course of action in the
South
they would
prefer, and were reminded to consider “where we wish to be at the
end of
Phase III,
as this could impact directly on any UK involvement in Phase
IV”.
1051.
The Inquiry
has not seen any detailed analysis underpinning
Lt Gen Reith’s
conclusion
that southern Iraq would be more manageable in the
post‑conflict
period than
the North.
1052.
The MOD
told No.10 on 19 November that the option of a military
campaign
launched on
6 January 2003 appeared to have lapsed, and the timelines
were
“uncertain”.
1053.
Mr Hoon
recommended that the UK should press the US for clarity on
the
Turkish
position.
1054.
If the UK
had to “fall back” on a role in the South, it would be looking
for
a role
in the invasion rather than providing follow‑on
forces.
1055.
MOD
concerns about the importance of post‑conflict operations and
the
need for
work on the implications for the UK approach to the campaign
are
addressed
in Section 6.4.
1056.
Following the
visits to the US by Sir Kevin Tebbit and Adm Boyce and in
advance
of the NATO
Summit in Prague on 21 November and the planned debate on Iraq in
the
House of
Commons on 25 November, Mr Watkins sent Sir David Manning
an update
on military
discussions with the US.417
He set out
the themes which had emerged
and registered
a number of concerns, including the need to press the US to
clarify
Turkey’s
position.
1057.
Mr Watkins
wrote that there was a need to “continue military preparations
to
underpin
the diplomacy/inspection track, without bringing forces to an
unsustainable
level of
readiness”. There was “a sense … that the realistic timetable for
action was
slipping”
but there had been “no US political endorsement of any later date
for planning
purposes”.
1058.
Mr Watkins
advised that the US continued to describe the northern front “as
an
essential
part of the plan”, but there was no clear agreement with Turkey
“who had
declined to
be definitive pending the appointment of a new Government”. The US
might
417
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 19 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning
after UNSCR 1441’.
334