The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
4.
The paper
identified “post‑conflict strategy” as one of eight components of a
UK
military
strategy for Iraq, recognising the need to “acknowledge that there
will be
a
post‑conflict phase with an associated commitment, manpower and
finance bill”.
Development
of an SSR model, support for training and provision of equipment
were
identified
as tasks to be undertaken in the “medium term (six months to two
years)”.
5.
From 20
September, the Cabinet Office‑led Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
(AHGI)
co‑ordinated
all non‑military cross‑government work on post‑conflict issues. The
creation
and role of
the AHGI is addressed in Section 2.
6.
In preparation
for the first meeting of the AHGI, Mr Jim Drummond, Assistant
Head
(Foreign
Affairs) of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat (OD
Sec),
wrote to
Mr Desmond Bowen, Deputy Head of OD Sec, suggesting
departmental
responsibilities
for different strands of post‑conflict planning.5
Mr Drummond
proposed
that reform
of the security sector and civil service should be led by the MOD
and the
Department
for International Development (DFID).
7.
On 27
September, the AHGI discussed a Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(FCO)
paper on
scenarios for the future of Iraq.6
The paper
stated:
“… we would
not expect the armed forces and security services to switch
allegiance
to any new
government en masse in the event of wholesale regime change. It
is
more likely
that key tribal leaders would seek to establish tribal/regional
power
bases.”
8.
The paper
concluded that, in order to achieve its overarching priorities, the
UK should
“if
possible avoid the root and branch dismantling of Iraq’s
governmental and security
structures”.
9.
The AHGI
called for the material on SSR in the paper to be
expanded.7
10.
The following
week, the FCO produced a paper entitled ‘Models for
Administering
a Post‑Saddam
Iraq’.8
Early
drafts described the military challenge of providing
security,
including starting a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR)
programme
(see Box, ‘Definition of terms’, earlier in this Section), but did
not address
comprehensive
reform of the security sector.
5
Minute
Drummond to Bowen, 19 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq
(AHGI)’.
6
Minute
McDonald to Manning, 26 September 2002, ‘Scenarios for the Future
of Iraq after Saddam’
attaching
Paper, [undated], ‘Scenarios for the Future of Iraq after
Saddam’.
7
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 30 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
8
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 4 October 2002, ‘Models for Administering a
Post‑Saddam Iraq’ attaching
Paper
[draft] FCO, [undated], ‘Models for Administering a Post‑Saddam
Iraq’.
68