The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
679.
TPUK sent
Mr Blair an update on commercial issues in Iraq on 10
October.403
TPUK’s
strategy was:
“… to
position UK firms … through the provision of information about
contracts,
procurement
issues, etc, and to press the US authorities (and the CPA) to
ensure
a level
playing field on which UK companies can compete.”
680.
TPUK advised
that the US had made it clear that while they welcomed
the
participation
of UK companies, there was no “special deal”.
681.
TPUK’s major
concern was the lack of openness in the CPA’s tendering
and
procurement
procedures, which might result in a bias towards US
companies.
TPUK was
lobbying on this issue in Baghdad and Washington, and had funded
a
procurement
consultant in the CPA Ministry of Finance “to make procurement
more
transparent
and ensure that UK firms were on the CPA’s bidding lists”. It would
also
fund secondments
to the PMO.
682.
The TPUK paper
considered oil and gas contracts separately from other
reconstruction
contracts; oil and gas contracts are addressed earlier in this
Section.
683.
TPUK reported
that UK firms were doing “quite well”, given that most of the
work
so far had
been US-funded. An analysis of Bechtel’s subcontracts showed that
Iraqi
firms had
won 36 percent, US firms 28 percent and UK firms 16 percent. UK
firms had
also won
major contracts in other areas.
684.
British Trade
International was subsequently renamed UK Trade and
Investment
(UKTI) and
the Trade Partners UK (TPUK) identity fell out of use.
685.
Congress
approved the CPA’s request for additional funds on 6
November,
allocating
US$18.4bn to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
(IRRF2).404
686.
Hard
Lessons recorded that,
at that time, the PMO comprised only Adm Nash,
two US
Government officials, and 13 contractors.405
687.
In December,
Mr David Warren, Director of the UKTI’s International Trade
Division,
provided a
review of UKTI’s experience of promoting UK business for
Mr Stephen
Haddrill,
Director-General of the UKTI’s Fair Markets Group:
“It took
time, initially, to persuade Ministers that this [promoting UK
commercial
interests]
was a legitimate objective that the Government should be seen to
be
promoting
actively, rather than by default …
403
Letter
Zimmer to Rycroft, 10 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Commercial
Issues’ attaching Paper UKTI,
10 October
2003, ‘Iraq: Update on Commercial Issues’.
404
Emergency
Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003.
405
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing Office,
2009.
476