The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
322.
A Cabinet
Office Ministerial update on 19 November stated:
“The CPA
has no current plans to draw up a formal policing strategy. Their
view is
that
command, control and administrative arrangements for the police
will depend
heavily on
unsettled constitutional issues and thus must await further
political
progress …
Partly in this context, Jim Daniel, a senior ex‑HO [Home Office]
adviser,
sent by us
to help generate a policing strategy has decided to
resign.” 287
323.
The update did
not state the UK’s view of the CPA position but said:
“In
response, we are following up a new request from DCC Brand … for
additional
UK officers
to support him in implementing the existing training
plan.”
324.
As early as
May 2003, Sir David Manning and Ambassador Bremer recognised
that:
“De‑Ba’athification
and the dissolution of security ministries would create a
new
reservoir
of angry men. So there was a need to step up patrols and tighten
up
325.
At the end of
2003, as security worsened, the debate around the extent to
which
de‑Ba’athification
should be applied to the Iraqi Security Forces was
ongoing.
326.
Between
October and December, the issue of re‑employing Ba’athist
security
personnel
was mentioned three times in communications between Mr Blair
and
President
Bush.
327.
On 7 October,
in a video conference with President Bush Mr Blair
“urged
sensitive handling
of demobilised ex‑Iraqi Army soldiers”.289
328.
In a video
conference on 27 October, Mr Blair highlighted the possibility
of
re‑mobilising
“former Ba’athist intelligence officers”.290
329.
Before
President Bush’s visit to the UK in November 2003, Mr Rycroft
gave
Mr Blair
a copy of a paper entitled ‘Iraq: Security’, for discussion with
President Bush.291
The
document was described as “Jeremy’s paper” and the Inquiry assumes
that it was
written by
Sir Jeremy Greenstock. Under the heading “Iraqiisation” it
said:
“Must
accept previously Ba’athist elements in the security
forces, provided
not linked
with former
repression. Militias … need to be brought in in an inclusive
transparent
way … plans
for this should be drawn up immediately with IGC.”
287
Letter Dodd
to Owen, 19 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for
Ministers’.
288
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 23 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Gerry
Bremer’.
289
Minute
Cannon to Adams, 7 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video‑Conference with
President Bush,
7 October’.
290
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 27 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Video‑Conference with
President Bush,
27 October’.
291
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 18 November 2003, ‘Bush Visit – Private
Talks’.
130