12.1 | Security Sector Reform

704. The covering note for Mr Blair from Mr Quarrey described the MOD’s paper as

“rather insubstantial, and almost certainly too optimistic in its assessment of the quality

of much of the ISF”.645

705. Lieutenent General Sir Graeme Lamb, General Officer Commanding (GOC)

MND(SE) from July to December 2003, reflected on the quality of the ISF in his evidence

to the Inquiry.646 He said:

“The point of corruption in this part of the world is with the police and at the lowest

level and yet we somehow were looking to try and make them into state troopers.

We were never going to achieve that. It was an aspect of us approaching in many

ways the problem seen through a Westminster or Washington perspective rather

than one that was very much more locally focused …”

706. In a telephone call with President Bush on 22 April, Mr Blair commented that “the

Iraqiisation plan did seem to be going well”.647 However, the insurgency remained well

armed and well financed. Mr Blair felt that there would be a greater sense of momentum

after the formation of the ITG.

707. Lieutenant General John Kiszely served as the SBMR‑I from October 2004 to

April 2005. His Hauldown Report contained an assessment of the ISF.648 He described

the leadership of the IMOD as “completely out of their depth” and the MOI as

“dysfunctional”, with the Minister bringing in his uncle to set up and run the Special Police.

708. In relation to the IPS, Lt Gen Kiszely assessed:

“… the selection process for these policemen … is rudimentary; they undertake

only eight weeks training; they are paid a very low wage; leadership at all levels is

generally poor; corruption is high. To expect such a force, mostly under‑strength and

poorly equipped, to perform well in the face of a ruthless insurgency is unrealistic,

and there have been occasions (for example in Mosul in November) when the whole

of a city’s police force has deserted their police stations in the face of attack or the

threat of it.”

709. Lt Gen Kiszely expressed concern about the Iraqi Special Police Commandos. He

considered that they had been “highly effective in tackling the insurgency” but he stated

that they had “no police training and are more akin to Black‑and‑Tans; many are former

members of the Republican Guard. Their methods are robust, and there have been

several cases of serious abuse, duly investigated, and no doubt many more that have

not been.”

645 Minute Quarrey to Prime Minister, 18 March 2005, ‘Iraq Update’.

646 Public hearing, 9 December 2009, page 42.

647 Letter Quarrey to Siddiq, 22 April 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Phone Call with President Bush’.

648 Minute Kiszely to CDS, 16 April 2005, ‘SBMR‑I’s Hauldown Report’.

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