4.4 | The
search for WMD
On
1 June, Mr Scarlett informed Sir David Manning that a US
inter-agency team with
one UK
representative continued to assess that the BW trailers “almost
certainly” formed
“part of
the mobile BW production facilities identified in [pre-invasion]
intelligence”.103
The
experts
could not think of “any other credible explanation”. That was also
“the firm view”
which had
been reported on the US Defense Intelligence Agency
website.
Mr Scarlett
added that a preliminary draft of the team’s report had stated that
the trailers,
as
presently configured, could not be used as a biological production
system. That report
had been
withdrawn. Mr Scarlett commented: “It really does seem that it
has no status.
Confusing
nonetheless.”
Mr Scarlett
concluded that there would be a further assessment of Iraq’s BW
capabilities,
but a
formal assessment could and should be issued only when “we feel
confident that we
have enough
data”.
Subsequent
assessments of the purpose of the trailers are set out later in
this Section.
188.
On
15 May, an official in NPD advised Mr Dowse
that:
•
Iraq’s two
most senior BW scientists were denying knowledge of recent
Iraqi
WMD
programmes.
•
The head of
Iraq’s National Monitoring Directorate was claiming that all
SCUD
missiles
had been destroyed between 1991 and 1993.
•
There was
“considerable frustration” about the absence of UK involvement
in
the US
interviews of scientists.104
189.
On
16 May, SIS informed the FCO that information emerging from
interviews
with
individuals prepared to discuss WMD confirmed some of the
original
judgements
about Iraq’s programmes.
190.
SIS advised
that it was not in the Government’s interest to allow
media
reports
that there was no evidence to justify pre-conflict claims to
become
received
wisdom.
191.
On
16 May, Sir Richard Dearlove’s Private Secretary sent
Mr McDonald an update
on progress
and ideas for changing public perceptions of Iraq’s WMD
programmes.105
192.
The letter
stated that the “poor security situation, apparent disconnect
between
parts of
the US system (and thus with UK agencies)” and problems flying in
and out of
Baghdad
were slowing down the effort, but SIS officers in Iraq were “fully
switched on to
the
task”.
103
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 1 June 2003, ‘BW Trailers’.
104
Minute NPD
[junior official] to Dowse, 15 May 2003, ‘Iraq Survey Group:
MOD Task Force Meeting,
15 May’.
105
Letter PS/C
to McDonald, 16 May 2003, ‘Iraqi WMD’.
463