The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
259.
The US and UK
began to circulate elements of the draft resolution, which
became
resolution
1441, to fellow Security Council members on 25
September.87
260.
Following
visits to Paris and Moscow by Mr Ricketts88
and a
conversation
between Sir
David Manning and Mr Jean‑Marc de La Sablière, Diplomatic
Adviser
to President Chirac,89
it became
clear that France and Russia had serious concerns
about the
key elements of the draft resolution proposed by the US and
UK.
261.
A perception
that the draft text of OP10 implied automaticity for the use of
force
was one
area of difficulty. As a result, both Sir Jeremy Greenstock and
Mr Ricketts
began to
consider how the UK should react if, as they had predicted, it
proved
impossible
to secure agreement to “all necessary means” in a first
resolution.90
262.
Sir Jeremy
advised that there was “a case for not showing too deep a
concern
about the
need to come back to the Council for a decision”. In his view, the
“primary
objective
of a first resolution” was to “establish unequivocal powers for the
inspectors
and hurdles
for Iraq”.
263.
Sir Jeremy
wrote that the US and UK should not “walk away” if the first
stage
failed;
that would “almost certainly lead to a critical resolution which we
would have
to veto”.
Instead they should “bear with it to a second stage”
when:
“… the
chance of persuading the Council to come with us will remain open;
and if
they
eventually do not, we will be seen to have tried harder, our
political case … will
look more
objective, and we shall be less likely … to confront a critical
resolution.”
264.
Sir Jeremy
also advised:
“There
will, of course, be differing views about what constitutes an Iraqi
sin of
sufficient
gravity to trigger a second resolution authorising
force.”
265.
Mr Ricketts
reported that he had told a US colleague that the UK
remained
“absolutely
firm on the need for an ‘all necessary means’ authorisation” but it
looked
as though
“we might well not win the argument”.91
While the
shared negotiating priority
was to take
a “hard position” on that point to “line up support for the
toughest possible
inspection
regime”, there was a recognition that “we would have to find a
middle way
between our
present position and an explicit two resolution approach”. They had
agreed
work was
needed on a formula which would achieve that.
87
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 7
November 2002, column 431.
88
Telegram
555 Paris to FCO London, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq: UNSC
Resolution’; Telegram 341
Moscow to
FCO London, 29 September 2002, ‘Iraq: UNSC
Resolution’.
89
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Contacts with the
French’.
90
Telegram
1861 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 27 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Security Council
Resolution’.
91
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 30 September 2002, ‘Iraq:
Security Council Resolution’.
248