The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry:
“… the
decision by the UN to withdraw from Iraq which they took around
about the
middle of
September after a security review, I think … was regrettable, and
it meant
for several
months they were not really playing any sort of role in Iraq. It
also meant
when
Lakhdar Brahimi [UN Special Adviser on Iraq] arrived, initially in
the end of
January
2004 and then again in April 2004, he was really working on his
own.”177
Sir David
Richmond told the Inquiry that Mr Vieira de Mello would have
played a very
influential
role in Iraq.178
Firstly
because of his personal qualities, and secondly
because:
“… he had a
direct link to Ayatollah Sistani, which neither Bremer nor the
UK
Special
Representatives had. Indeed he had, so we are led to believe …
suggested
to
Ayatollah Sistani that elections could be held in Iraq really quite
quickly. It was
this fact
that caused a huge amount of complications in the autumn of 2003 as
we
were trying
to find a political process that would lead to the transition to a
sovereign
government.
Had he not been killed he, of course, would have been the link
with
Sistani,
and the problems we had with Sistani I think would have been far
fewer. The
fact he had
that – because at the time in August you have to be clear we had
not
realised in
the CPA that Sistani was going to be as influential as he was. We
knew
that he had
issued this fatwa and so on but we did not know the fatwa was going
to
be an
insurmountable obstacle. That became apparent as time
progressed.”
296.
The first
Coalition update to the Security Council under the terms of
resolution
1483 was
provided on 21 August.179
297.
The US and the
UK had planned to go into some detail about achievements
in
Iraq, but
the UN bombing on 19 August meant Ambassador Negroponte, US
Permanent
Representative
to the UN, and Sir Emyr Jones Parry, UK Permanent Representative
to
the UN in
New York, instead delivered a much shorter and more downbeat
report.180
298.
The report
highlighted both the need for the international community to
increase its
contribution
to building a secure future for Iraq and the vital role of the
UN.181
299.
Reporting on
the Security Council’s reaction, Sir Emyr recorded that
“responses
were only
preliminary. But all those that spoke expressed their willingness
to work
together on
a new resolution, and welcomed the open approach we were
taking.”
300.
Mr Duclos,
French Permanent Representative to the UN, said that the “UN
could
not be
expected to share more of the burden without sharing more of the
authority” and
Mr Sergei
Lavrov, Russian Permanent Representative to the UN, remarked on the
need
for clarity
on the UN’s role before member states would contribute
more.
177
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, page 43.
178
Public
hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 41-42.
179
Telegram
1208 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 22 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Coalition
Update and New
Resolution’.
180
Telegram
1512 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 27 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Update Under 1483’.
181
Telegram
1208 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 22 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Coalition
Update and New
Resolution’.
258