The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
821.
Mr Jon
Day, MOD Director General (Security Policy), told the Inquiry that
the
cease-fire
not only brought a reduction in attacks on coalition forces in
Basra:
“But the
critical strategic dividend, as far as we were concerned, was that
the overall
decline in
violence helped encourage the resurgence of real political activity
…
“Another
consequence, which … was felt to be quite important by those on
the
ground at
the time … is that prior to the understandings,
coalition-sponsored
reconstruction
work in Basra had almost come to a stop. The
understandings
reduced the
threat to military and civilian workers and that allowed work on
projects
such as the
Basra Children’s Hospital to start up again and to enable us to
plan to
do more
work elsewhere in Basra.” 473
822.
Section 9.6
describes negotiations between the UK and JAM1.
823.
Mr Asquith’s
16 August valedictory letter to Mr Miliband focused on
security and the
political
process, but also reflected on the UK’s role in
reconstruction:
“Outside
the military contribution, our favoured route has been through
providing
expertise.
That will remain necessary, but insufficient. The Iraqis prize
lasting
legacies …
We should consider with an open mind taking a leaf out of the
Japanese
book,
making use of some of the savings on the defence side to establish
a joint or
soft loan
financial development fund for specific projects in the education
or health
sectors.
Easier, and more realistic, would be to establish a large trust
fund for a
permanent
scholarship scheme to supplement Chevening. Or we should switch
our
… focus to
an area where we can operate – namely the Kurdish region which
we
have
consistently and puzzlingly ignored.” 474
824.
UK troops were
withdrawn from the BPC to BAS on 2 and 3 September.475
825.
DFID advised
No.10 on 5 September that since Mr Brown’s 29 July letter
to
Prime
Minister Maliki, there had been slow but sure progress on
Mr Brown’s economic
initiative.476
With the
support of the PRT and DFID, the Basra Provincial Council
had:
•
Agreed a
new Provincial Development Strategy. The flow of funds from
Baghdad
was also
starting to increase.
•
Agreed with
the central Government the “broad shape and purpose” of
BIPA,
which would
be to identify investment opportunities, provide advice to
business
and
government, and implement programmes to stimulate private
sector
development.
The UK was also helping the Council to take forward plans for
the
physical
establishment of the BIPA.
473
Public
hearing, 6 January 2010, pages 35-36.
474
Letter
Asquith to Miliband, 16 August 2007, ‘Iraq:
Valedictory’.
475
Minute
Binns to CJO, 6 September 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – southern Iraq
Update –
6 September
2007’.
476
Paper DFID,
5 September 2007, ‘Basra – Economic Initiative Progress
Report’.
328