The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
288.
The points
made by Sir Jeremy included:
•
the early
drafts of what became resolution 1441 “were discussed
among
members of
the P5, bilaterally, and in extensive and frequent conversations
at
Ministerial
level”;
•
a text was
not finally “agreed by” all members of the P5 until 7 November;
and
•
he had
“convened meetings with the non-Permanent Members
during
the
drafting process to make sure they were aware of
developments.
The significance
of the proposals for what became OP 4, 11 and 12 were
fully discussed
on these occasions.”
289.
Despite
being told that advice was not needed for Mr Blair’s meeting
with
President
Bush on 31 January, Lord Goldsmith wrote on 30 January to
emphasise
that his
view remained that resolution 1441 did not authorise the use of
military
force
without a further determination by the Security
Council.
290.
That was
the third time Lord Goldsmith had felt it necessary to put his
advice
to
Mr Blair in writing without having been asked to do so; and on
this occasion he
had been
explicitly informed that it was not needed.
291.
Lord
Goldsmith had made only a “provisional” interpretation of
resolution
1441, but
his position was firmly and clearly expressed.
292.
It was also
consistent with the advice given by Mr Wood to
Mr Straw.
293.
Despite the
message that his advice was not needed before the meeting
with
President
Bush, Lord Goldsmith decided to write to Mr Blair on 30
January, stating:
“I thought
you might wish to know where I stand on the question of whether a
further
decision of
the Security Council is legally required in order to authorise the
use of
294.
Lord Goldsmith
informed Mr Blair that the meeting with Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
had been
“extremely useful”, and that “it was in fact the first time that
the arguments in
support of
the case that there is no need for a further Council decision had
been put to
me in
detail”. He had “considered carefully” the “important points” Sir
Jeremy had made.
Lord
Goldsmith wrote that he was “preparing a more detailed note of
advice” which
would set
out his “conclusions in relation to those arguments”.
295.
Lord Goldsmith
added that he had “indicated to Sir David Manning” that he
“would
welcome the
opportunity, if arrangements can be made in time, to hear the views
of
my US
counterparts on the interpretation of resolution 1441”. He was “not
convinced”
that it
would “make any difference to my view”, but he remained “ready to
hear any
arguments”.
110
Minute
Goldsmith to Prime Minister, 30 January 2003,
‘Iraq’.
56