The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
asked to
consider whether a political agreement would be sufficient or
whether the UK
should move
on 1 January 2009 to a “normal” bilateral relationship with
Iraq.
270.
The
implications of the second scenario (a political agreement) were
that the UK
would have
to “adjust” its force posture and halt activities supporting combat
operations.
Since UK
forces would only be able to carry out advisory tasks, “the US
would have to
complete
much of our mission in Basra”.
271.
If no
agreement was secured (the third scenario), UK forces would have to
“leave
as quickly
as possible”, causing reputational damage for the Army in
particular.
272.
Since
Mr McDonald’s discussion with Prime Minister Maliki, the paper
explained
that
continued negotiations had produced a proposal for:
“•
a short
draft law to the CoR [Council of Representatives] with:
authorisation for
UK (and
Australian) forces to remain in Iraq until 31 July 2009 and
exemption
from Iraqi
jurisdiction for those forces; and a statement that Maliki shall
set the
necessary
arrangements for the tasks and missions of these
forces.
•
complement
this law with a (non-legally binding) EoL [Exchange of
Letters]
between
governments enshrining the tasks.”
273.
This proposal
looked “acceptable from a legal perspective” but carried
“some
political
risk”, specifically that Prime Minister Maliki might leave the
legislation “to its own
fate” in
the Iraqi Council of Representatives.
274.
An annex to
the paper suggested that the key elements of future relations with
Iraq
should
be:
•
diplomatic
and political activity – lobbying and influencing in support of the
full
range of UK
activities, encouraging Iraq’s political development and the
usual
migration
and consular activities conducted by an Embassy;
•
economic
development – influencing Iraqi economic policy and
supporting
further
capacity building on public finance management, investment, trade
and
higher
education;
•
defence –
continued support for the coalition Naval Training Team,
capacity
building
within the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, and Royal Naval and Royal
Air
Force
participation in coalition maritime and air operations in Iraq and
in the
Northern
Arabian Gulf;
•
energy –
ensuring the security of Iraq’s oil supply and long-term increase
in
oil output;
•
commercial
– support for trade missions, UK investor visits and political
lobbying
to ensure a
level playing field for UK exporters and investors;
and
•
education –
increased collaboration with Iraqi educational institutions,
civil
society,
student exchanges and English language training.
426