9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
942.
Mr Rycroft
reported that Mr Blair’s initial view on the US request was
that, provided
it made
military sense and was achievable, MND(SE) should be expanded to
include
Najaf
(where the Spanish troops had been based), but that care should be
taken to
avoid any
increase in the overall number of UK forces. He did not rule out
the use of the
ARRC in the
longer term, but did not want to rush into a decision on
it.
943.
On 26 April,
Sir David Manning, British Ambassador to the US, described
to
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald a conversation with Mr Bob
Blackwill.521
944.
Sir David
reported that a video conference between Mr Blair and
President Bush,
planned for
the following day, was more than usually important. The President
was
reported to
be “more or less” in the same place as Mr Blair and, although
he would not
be
receptive to the argument that action could be avoided in Fallujah,
“he was certainly
open to
discussion about how to conduct it, and to manage the
consequences”.
945.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 27
April.522
Vice President
Cheney, Dr Rice, Mr Blackwill and Sir Nigel Sheinwald all
joined
the discussion,
which went over points from Mr Blair’s Note.
946.
Those
attending discussed the new resolution, which would not go into
detail on
the
security agreement, but would recognise the Interim Government as
sovereign,
formally
ending the Occupation. It was anticipated that Mr Brahimi
would “stand up” an
Interim
Government at the end of May.
947.
Mr Blair
said that it was right to handle Fallujah progressively; “slow
strangulation”
was the
right approach and would encourage some insurgents to abandon the
cause.
948.
Mr Blair
followed advice to be non-committal on the US request for the UK
to
deploy
additional troops whilst the details were considered. He said only
that the UK was
considering
what it could do to help.
949.
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry:
“I think at
the time I was worried the Americans were going in too hard and
too
heavy, and
they made certain changes as a result of the conversations we
were
having. If
I look back on it now, I’m not sure I was right about it,
though.”523
950.
Mr Powell
also told the Inquiry that Mr Blair was very worried about a
full-on
assault on
Fallujah, and was keen that “it wasn’t done in that
way”.524
He
described
a series
of telephone calls and a meeting, and recollected that President
Bush did
hold off
and then attacked in a different way.
521
Letter
Manning to Sheinwald, 26 April 2004, ‘Iraq: Fallujah’.
522
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 27 April 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 27
April: Iraq’.
523
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 209.
524
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 132-133.
361