6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

• First, the military wanted to participate at a command level and thought that

standing by the US was important to the relationship with the US military “on

which they crucially depended”.

• Second, Mr Blair “felt that, if we were going to do it, we should be with the

Americans properly”.370

939. Sir David Manning told the Inquiry that the reasons for participating in a land

invasion “should be for state reasons, for political reasons”.371 In his view, what the

US particularly wanted was use of bases, “Cyprus and Diego Garcia”, Special Forces

and aircraft.

940. Sir David Manning acknowledged that the relationship between the size of the

UK contribution and the degree of influence it bought was “not a wholly spurious

argument”.372 There had been Defence Reviews which:

“… argued that we must be capable of fighting with the Americans in hot wars, and

if we suddenly show we can’t do that, we are not willing to do that, that changes the

perspective.”

941. But Sir David added that was, in his view, not a “clinching argument” in relation to

Iraq. The UK’s “willingness to take our fair share had been very clear in Afghanistan”.

He did not feel that the UK’s “influence was likely to suffer particularly if we said there’s

a limit to what we can do”.

942. Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry that the decision “was not a narrow military issue”;

it should be considered in the context of Mr Blair’s policy that the disarmament of

Saddam Hussein was the most important single thing to do at that stage. In that broader

context, it was, therefore:

“… very valid for us to seek to make a significant contribution … to international

stability.”373

943. Mr Hoon told the Inquiry that in his view it had been “recognised ultimately” that

the decision on Package 3 “was a political judgement for the Prime Minister, in terms

of the wider picture of the kind of things we had been discussing in terms of influence

and coherence”.374

944. Mr Hoon’s minute of 15 October suggested that Mr Blair should attach conditions

to the offer of Package 3. There is no indication that the UK did so.

370 Public hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 90‑91.

371 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 99.

372 Private hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 101‑102.

373 Public hearing, 3 December 2009, pages 39‑40.

374 Public hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 50.

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