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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
764.  Asked whether there had been a debate about different scenarios and different
possible courses, Lord Boateng, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury from 2002 to 2005,
replied:
“… there was certainly a discussion around different scenarios that came up in the
way in which we addressed these issues in Cabinet …
“… in the September meeting, where, as you know, we were about to publish the
dossier, there was about to be a report to Parliament and there was a discussion
around that and it was a full discussion and, in the course of that, colleagues made
various contributions and various scenarios surfaced …
“What we did have was a full discussion around the issues as they were reported
to us …”425
765.  Addressing the September 2002 dossier on Iraq in his memoir, written after
his resignation from the Government, Mr Robin Cook, the Leader of the House
Commons, wrote:
“At Cabinet [on 24 September 2002] I described the dossier as ‘derivative’. What I
was expressing was the extraordinary degree to which the bulk of the document was
derived from what we know about Saddam’s arsenal … as it had been in 1991 …
What was doubtful was whether the arsenal that Saddam possessed in 1991 was
any guide whatsoever to the state of his capacity in 2002.
“For a start most chemical and biological agents that Saddam had retained for
a decade would long ago have degenerated to the point that they were of no
operational use. This is a principle of science well known to those who wrote the
dossier … Government Ministers alarmed the public by claims that Saddam had ten
thousand litres of anthrax solution unaccounted for since 1991. They never added
that the standard life of liquid anthrax is three years …
“… Last year the US Department of Defense … revealed, ‘When the Iraqis produced
chemical munitions they appeared to adhere to a ‘make and use’ regimen … Their
conclusion was that the shelf life of Iraqi chemical agents was numbered in weeks,
not decades.
“Half of the text relating to Iraq’s weapons capacity is drawn from the period before
1998. Much of the remainder depends for its claims of present capacity on historic
capabilities … Stripped of the historical resume … the dossier is very thin on new
evidence on the current position.”426
425  Public hearing, 14 July 2010, pages 4-5.
426  Cook R. The Point of Departure. Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
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