The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
He stated
that “[m]ore widely”, a “succession of speeches, articles and media
events”
were needed
“to highlight the wider proliferation problem”.
686.
Mr Scarlett
commented on Mr Tenet’s “spotlighting” in his
speech:
“…
particular intelligence from a trusted intelligence partner (ie the
UK). The
media of
course were watching like hawks for any signs of UK/US splits.
Some
had
interpreted Tenet’s comments as laying the ground to shift the
blame for faulty
intelligence
to SIS.”
687.
Mr Scarlett
also discussed the debate in Washington and its focus on
whether
intelligence
had been politicised, and whether the assessments had been wrong.
On the
former,
there were comments about the highly politicised environment and
the extent
to which
“very persistent lines of questioning” from politicians might have
led analysts
“further
towards particular judgements than they would have moved of their
own accord”.
688.
Mr Wood,
who accompanied Mr Scarlett to the meeting, commented
afterwards
that, in
the wake of Mr Tenet’s speech, there remained “ample potential
for a serious
public
CIA/White House blame game between now and the [US presidential]
election”.
689.
Mr Blair
described his meeting with Mr Duelfer to President Bush during
their video
conference
on 10 February.382
Mr Blair
said that, if there were an ISG interim report
by the end
of March, it would define the issue for some time. It therefore
needed to be
detailed,
with factual backing, and carefully handled. Mr Duelfer had a
clear idea of
what was
needed, including background on the Iraqi concealment effort,
destruction of
documentation,
and the compartmentalisation of the WMD programmes.
690.
SIS sent No.10
a copy of a senior officer’s speaking note dated 10 February
for an
address to
staff on the issue of why no WMD had been found in
Iraq.383
691.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald drew Mr Blair’s attention to the note’s conclusion
that critics
were
unlikely to be proved wrong in the short term, but that the story
of Iraq’s WMD
would come
out in the end.384
692.
Mr Blair
commented on the paper:
“But is
Duelfer + ISG now working? That’s what we must press. But this is
a
382
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 10 February 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s
Video-Conference with President Bush,
10 February’.
383
Paper
[senior SIS officer’s speaking note for an address to staff],
10 February 2004, ‘Why have we
found no
WMD in Iraq?’
384
Manuscript
comment Sheinwald on Paper [senior SIS officer’s speaking note for
an address to staff],
10 February
2004, ‘Why have we found no WMD in Iraq?’
385
Manuscript
comment Blair on Paper [senior SIS officer’s speaking note for an
address to staff],
10 February
2004, ‘Why have we found no WMD in Iraq?’
560