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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
How to reform the working culture of the security sector, “particularly the police
and the courts, so that it operates on the basis of humanitarian values in support
of a legitimate government”?4
6.  Between December 2002 and March 2003, very little progress was made in
answering those questions. SSR was not always referred to in consideration of
post‑conflict operations. Specific plans were not developed for what would be done
on the ground.
7.  The UK saw a need to understand the US strategy before developing its own. That
was consistent with the broad UK approach to post‑conflict planning, on which the UK
assumed that the US would lead, as addressed in Section 6.5.
8.  The UK’s short and medium term objectives for SSR were articulated by the MOD in
February 2003. They were defined in very broad terms, with the desired end state: “to
include the restructuring of the intelligence agencies, armed forces, police and criminal
justice system. All elements of the Security Sector to be affordable and accountable”.5
9.  From 7 February onwards, responsibility for the UK’s policy on SSR sat with the
FCO under the leadership of Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir Michael
Jay, the Permanent Under Secretary. From 10 April, Mr Straw also chaired the Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR).
10.  Two teams in the FCO had a key role in relation to SSR:
the Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), established to improve Whitehall co‑ordination on
post‑conflict issues and provide policy guidance on the practical questions that
UK civilian officials and military commanders would face in Iraq; and
the United Nations Department (UND), which would help to identify, train and
deploy civilian police to Iraq.
11.  The US‑led Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT) was
responsible for the training of the New Iraqi Army. The UK provided nine military officers
in June 2003 to assist with that task, one of which was to act as the Deputy Commander
of CMATT. It appears from the evidence that, in practice, the MOD led on this aspect
of SSR.
12.  On the eve of the invasion, there was no coherent SSR strategy in place between
Coalition partners. That was described as a “high‑level risk”6 by the MOD’s Defence
Advisory Team.
4 Paper FCO Middle East Department, 10 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Sector Reform’.
5 Paper MOD [unattributed], 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq – Phase IV Subjects’.
6 Minute IPU [junior official] to IPU, 18 March 2003, ‘Security Sector Reform: Future Iraqi Armed Forces’
attaching Paper Defence Advisory Team, March 2003, ‘Security Sector Reform: Future Iraqi Armed
Forces’.
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