The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
How to
reform the working culture of the security sector, “particularly
the police
and the
courts, so that it operates on the basis of humanitarian values in
support
of a
legitimate government”?4
6.
Between
December 2002 and March 2003, very little progress was made
in
answering
those questions. SSR was not always referred to in consideration
of
post‑conflict
operations. Specific plans were not developed for what would be
done
on the
ground.
7.
The UK saw a
need to understand the US strategy before developing its own.
That
was
consistent with the broad UK approach to post‑conflict planning, on
which the UK
assumed
that the US would lead, as addressed in Section 6.5.
8.
The UK’s short
and medium term objectives for SSR were articulated by the MOD
in
February
2003. They were defined in very broad terms, with the desired end
state: “to
include the
restructuring of the intelligence agencies, armed forces, police
and criminal
justice
system. All elements of the Security Sector to be affordable and
accountable”.5
9.
From 7
February onwards, responsibility for the UK’s policy on SSR sat
with the
FCO under
the leadership of Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, and
Sir Michael
Jay, the
Permanent Under Secretary. From 10 April, Mr Straw also
chaired the Ad Hoc
Ministerial
Group on Iraq Rehabilitation (AHMGIR).
10.
Two teams in
the FCO had a key role in relation to SSR:
•
the Iraq
Planning Unit (IPU), established to improve Whitehall co‑ordination
on
post‑conflict
issues and provide policy guidance on the practical questions
that
UK civilian
officials and military commanders would face in Iraq;
and
•
the United
Nations Department (UND), which would help to identify, train
and
deploy
civilian police to Iraq.
11.
The US‑led
Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT)
was
responsible
for the training of the New Iraqi Army. The UK provided nine
military officers
in June
2003 to assist with that task, one of which was to act as the
Deputy Commander
of CMATT.
It appears from the evidence that, in practice, the MOD led on this
aspect
of SSR.
12.
On the eve of
the invasion, there was no coherent SSR strategy in place
between
Coalition
partners. That was described as a “high‑level risk”6
by the
MOD’s Defence
Advisory
Team.
4
Paper FCO
Middle East Department, 10 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Sector
Reform’.
5
Paper MOD
[unattributed], 5 February 2003, ‘Iraq – Phase IV
Subjects’.
6
Minute IPU
[junior official] to IPU, 18 March 2003, ‘Security Sector Reform:
Future Iraqi Armed Forces’
attaching
Paper Defence Advisory Team, March 2003, ‘Security Sector Reform:
Future Iraqi Armed
Forces’.
416