The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

on full responsibility for the South of the country including the future funding of all

infrastructure. Such a commitment would be financially and logistically enormous,

and well beyond DFID’s budget. We need to keep pressing [Ambassador] Bremer

to make more effective use of CPA resources …”

558. Baroness Amos wrote to Mr Boateng on 10 September to request an additional

£6.5m from the Reserve to cover immediate further needs in Iraq, and that a further

£33.5m should be “ear‑marked” within the Reserve for anticipated requirements later

in the financial year.338 Those anticipated requirements included £20m for a future

contribution to the Essential Services Plan if CPA funding proved insufficient.

559. Baroness Amos advised that the £40m she was requesting represented the

balance of the US$100m/£60m announced by Mr Brown in his 9 April statement to

Parliament, to “back up the UN and the work of reconstruction and development”.

560. The following day, in a letter to Mr Blair, Baroness Amos advised that:

“… our overall approach has been predicated on CPA delivering more than it has,

and we have had negligible influence on them, or the Pentagon, to try and turn it

around. Immediate measures are now needed to maintain the Iraqi population’s

consent.”339

561. The Essential Services Plan would help, but solving the underlying problems in

infrastructure would require billions of dollars and an Iraqi government to set policy.

Systemic problems within the CPA continued to delay the transfer of promised CPA

resources to the South. Baroness Amos concluded:

“If CPA HQ and [the] US Government fail to get its act together quickly, then we

can only plug the gap if my earlier Reserve claim … is approved.”

562. A Treasury official provided advice to Mr Boateng on 18 September on how

the Treasury intended to deal with the expected surge in Iraq‑related claims on the

Reserve.340

563. Departments had seen Mr Blair’s call for a step change in the UK effort in Iraq

(on 3 June) as “a legitimate invitation” to bid for more resources. They were developing

or considering seven bids. The largest of those was a bid being prepared by DFID for

around £250m, as the UK’s additional contribution to Iraq’s reconstruction.

564. It was vitally important to maintain pressure on departments, both at Ministerial and

official level, not to submit claims in the first place. The Treasury would also continue to

push for greater co‑ordination between departments in funding Iraq programmes.

338 Letter Amos to Boateng, 10 September 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction Funding: Reserve Claim’.

339 Telegram 1 DFID London to IraqRep, 11 September 2003, ‘Iraq Reconstruction: Cabinet Discussion

on 11 September’.

340 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Chief Secretary, 18 September 2003, ‘Iraq Funding FY 2003‑04:

Dealing with Reserve Claims’.

536