Executive Summary

FORCE LEVEL REVIEW

773.  The balance of forces between Iraq and Afghanistan was reviewed by DOP in

February 2007 on the basis that the UK could only sustain the enduring operational

deployment of eight battlegroups.

774.  ACM Stirrup’s “strong advice”,271 with which DOP agreed, was that the UK should

provide two additional battlegroups to the International Security Assistance Force in

Afghanistan, reducing the Iraq to Afghanistan battlegroup ratio from 6:2 to 5:3 and

then 4:4.

775.  This advice did not include an assessment of either the actual state of security

in Basra or the impact on the UK’s ability to deliver its objectives (including that

drawdown should be conditions‑based) and responsibilities under resolution 1723 (2006).

The advice did identify US “nervousness” about the UK proposals.

776.  In early May, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, sought ACM

Stirrup’s advice on the future of the UK military presence in Iraq. ACM Stirrup advised

that the UK should press ahead with drawdown from Iraq on the basis that there was

little more the UK could achieve. There was “no militarily useful mission”.272

777.  Mr Blair was concerned about the implications of ACM Stirrup’s position unless

the political circumstances in Basra changed first. He commented: “it will be very hard

to present as anything other than a total withdrawal ... it cd be very dangerous for the

stability of Iraq, & the US will, rightly, be v. concerned.”273

778.  After visiting Basra again in mid‑May, ACM Stirrup continued to recommend the

drawdown of UK forces. But other contemporary evidence indicated a more negative

picture of circumstances in Basra than ACM Stirrup’s view that:

“... the Iraqis are increasingly in a position to take on responsibility for their own

problems and therefore they might wish to look to propose the south of the country

as a model through which we can recommend a drawdown of forces.”274

779.  In July 2007, FCO and MOD officials recognised that leaving Basra Palace would

mean moving to PIC in fact if not in name. Mr Brown, who had become Prime Minister

in June, was keen that the gap between leaving the Palace and transfer to PIC should

be as small as possible, since UK situational awareness and ability to conduct operations

in Basra would be limited once the Palace was no longer in use.

780.  During a visit to Iraq at the start of July, ACM Stirrup sought to convince

senior US officers that Basra was ready for transfer to PIC on the basis that it would

not be possible to demonstrate readiness until after the transfer had taken place.

271 Paper MOD officials, 13 February 2007, ‘Iraq and Afghanistan: Balancing Military Effort in 2007’.

272 Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.

273 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 3 May 2007, ‘Iraq’.

274 Minute Poffley to PSSC/SofS [MOD], 17 May 2007, ‘CDS visit to Iraq 13‑16 May 07’.

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