6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
554.
The Chiefs of
Staff were “concerned that extending the AO would
overstretch
Phase III
and Phase IV resources and potentially detract from the Main Effort
in the
UK AO”.
555.
Adm Boyce
directed Lt Gen Reith “to proceed with the main effort, of an
exemplary
Phase IV,
in the original AO (Southern AO) with operations in the Northern AO
as
required to
achieve a speedy and successful Phase III and to shape Phase
IV”.
556.
AM Burridge
wrote in his Hauldown Report on 8 May:
“Our
overriding consideration was for the GOC [Maj Gen Brims] to
condition his
own AO, in
preparation for stability operations (Phase IV), rather than
inherit
circumstances
[created by others] …”181
557.
Lt Gen Reith’s
advice of 11 March for the Chiefs of Staff on the gaps in UK
and
US planning
for post-conflict operations, including the absence of a detailed
UK/US
policy on
the role of the military in maintaining law and order and detaining
civilians,
is
addressed in Section 6.5.
558.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit raised the absence of an agreed legal basis for
military
action with
Sir Andrew Turnbull on 5 March.
559.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit wrote to Sir Andrew Turnbull on 5 March,
stating:
“I am sure
you have this in hand already, but in case it might help, I should
like to
offer you
my thoughts on the procedure for handling the legal basis for any
offensive
operations
… in Iraq – a subject touching on my responsibilities since it is
the CDS
[Chief of
the Defence Staff] who will need to be assured that he will be
acting on the
basis of a
lawful instruction from the Prime Minister and the Defence
Secretary.
“It is not
possible to be certain about the precise circumstances in which
this would
arise
because we cannot be sure about the UN scenario involved … Clearly
full UN
cover is
devoutly to be desired – and not just for the military operation
itself …
“My purpose
in writing, however, is not to argue the legal merits of the case …
but to
flag up …
that the call to action from President Bush could come at quite
short notice
and that we
need to be prepared to handle the legalities so we can deliver
…
“In these
circumstances, I suggest that the Prime Minister should be
prepared
to convene
a special meeting of the inner ‘war’ Cabinet (Defence and
Foreign
Secretaries
certainly, Chancellor, DPM [Deputy Prime Minister], Home
Secretary
possibly,
Attorney General, crucially) at which CDS effectively receives his
legal and
constitutional
authorisation. We have already given the Attorney General
information
181
Report
Burridge to CJO, 8 May 2003, ‘NCC Operation Telic Hauldown Report:
07 Feb 03 – 08 May 03’.
473