The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
408.
Mr Powell
likewise recognises the importance of having written advice which
can
be seen
before a meeting, allowing all those present to have shared
information and
the
opportunity to digest it and seek further advice if necessary. This
allows the time in
meetings to
be used productively.
409.
The Inquiry
considers that there should have been collective discussion by
a
Cabinet
Committee or small group of Ministers on the basis of
inter‑departmental advice
agreed at a
senior level between officials at a number of decision points which
had a
major
impact on the development of UK policy before the invasion of Iraq.
Those were:
•
The
decision at the beginning of December 2001 to offer to work with
President
Bush on a
strategy to deal with Iraq as part of Phase 2 of the “War on
Terror”,
despite the
fact that there was no evidence of any Iraqi involvement
with the
attacks on
the US or active links to Al Qaida.
•
The
adoption of the position at the end of February 2002 that Iraq was
a threat
which had
to be dealt with, together with the assumption that the only
certain
means to
remove Saddam Hussein and his regime was to invade Iraq
and
impose a
new government.
•
The
position Mr Blair should adopt in discussions with President
Bush at
Crawford in
April 2002. The meeting at Chequers on 2 April was given
a
presentation
on the military options and did not explore the political and
legal
implications
of a conflict with Iraq. There was no FCO representative at
the
Chequers
meeting and no subsequent meeting with Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon.
•
The
position Mr Blair should adopt in his discussion with
President Bush at
Camp David
on 5 and 6 September 2002. Mr Blair’s long Note of 28 July,
telling
President
Bush “I will be with you, whatever”, was seen, before it was sent,
only
by No.10
officials. A copy was sent afterwards to Mr Straw, but not to
Mr Hoon.
While the
Note was marked “Personal” (to signal that it should have a
restricted
circulation),
it represented an extensive statement of the UK
Government’s
position by
the Prime Minister to the President of the United States. The
Foreign
and Defence
Secretaries should certainly have been given an opportunity
to
comment on
the draft in advance.
•
A
discussion in mid‑September 2002 on the need for robust
post‑conflict
planning.
•
The
decision on 31 October 2002 to offer ground forces to the US for
planning
purposes.
•
The
decision on 17 January 2003 to deploy large scale ground forces
for
operations
in southern Iraq.
•
The
position Mr Blair should adopt in his discussion with
President Bush
in Washington
on 31 January 2003.
•
The
proposals in Mr Blair’s Note to President Bush of 19 February
suggesting
a deadline
for a vote in the Security Council of 14 March.
58