4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
619.
Dr Jones told
Lord Hutton that he had been informed of the concerns of his
staff
about the
statements on the “continued production of chemical and biological
agents”;
and that
there “was said to be additional intelligence that actually had it
been available
to us would
have removed those concerns”.335
He had
discussed the issue with his
Director,
Dr Roper. Dr Roper had not seen the intelligence but “a senior
official from
one of the
… agencies” had “suggested to him that the intelligence judgements
that
were being
made in the dossier were in fact okay because … they were
supported
by the additional
intelligence”. Dr Jones added that he had said the DIS should
express
a
reservation about the language.
620.
Dr Jones
subsequently stated that his staff had “no evidence that
significant
production
had taken place either of chemical warfare agent or chemical
weapons”.336
621.
Dr Jones also
stated that the DIS had “not seen the weapons being
produced.
We had
no evidence of any recent testing or field trials
…”337
622.
Asked what he
had done following receipt of Dr Jones’ minute, Mr Cragg
told
the Hutton
Inquiry that he had:
“… taken
the view that on the question of the 45 minutes and of the
chemical
weapon
production, this had already been considered at length with the
Cabinet
Office in
their meeting of 17 September and that I was satisfied with the
decisions
reached and
consequently with the wording of the dossier at that point.
On the …
importance
attached to the possession of chemical weapons, the absence
of
proof …
they are not seen … as weapons of last resort. And the absence of
…
definitive
proof, that efforts are being made to conceal them. I took the view
on
each of
those there had been much intelligence over the years, not merely
in the
last few
weeks … which sustained the view taken in the
dossier.”338
623.
Asked whether
Dr Jones’ minute of 19 September 2002 was “strong
language
for intelligence
personnel”, Mr Cragg replied:
“Yes. I was
quite surprised to receive the minute because … we had tried to
explain
what the
situation was, certainly on the production issue and, as far as I
can tell also
perhaps,
although I am not certain, on the 45 minutes.”339
624.
Mr Cragg
stated that he had “taken the view that since all the issues had
either
been
discussed with the Cabinet Office or were well within the general
thrust of known
intelligence
that it was not necessary to raise the issue with
Mr Scarlett”.340
335
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 3 September 2003, pages
83-85.
336
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 3 September 2003, page 86.
337
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 3 September 2003, page 93.
338
The
National Archives, 28 January 2004, Report of
the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Death
of Dr David Kelly [“The Hutton
Report”], paragraph 194.
339
The
National Archives, 28 January 2004, Report of
the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Death
of Dr David Kelly [“The Hutton
Report”], paragraph 194.
340
The Hutton
Inquiry, public hearing, 15 September 2003, page 41.
233