9.7 | May 2008 to October 2009

reported to believe it would be near impossible to secure Cabinet and Parliamentary

agreement.

417. FCO and MOD officials in Baghdad were engaged in a final round of lobbying but

Mr Hutton cautioned that Ministers might “need to make a decision shortly on whether

to withdraw all remaining UK forces from Iraq”. To do so by 31 July, as the December

agreement required, would mean military commanders needed instructions to depart

by 15 June.

418. The key disagreement was about jurisdictional immunities for UK troops, which

the Council of Ministers had diluted “to such an extent that I [Mr Hutton] and the Chief

of Defence Staff consider them unacceptable”.

419. Mr Brown’s Assistant Private Secretary reminded Mr Brown that:

“Our December agreement was already less than some other NATO allies were

prepared to accept – so any further dilution also risks the future NATO training

mission.”169

420. Mr Brown told his Assistant Private Secretary that he was prepared to speak to

Prime Minister Maliki provided the groundwork had been done, and was prepared also

to speak to other Iraqi politicians.170 He suggested that the government could “send out

David M[iliband] or John H[utton] to talk to people”.

421. Mr Brown telephoned Prime Minister Maliki early on 26 May.171

422. In a brief for the conversation, Mr Brown’s Assistant Private Secretary reported that

Prime Minister Maliki was thought to be concerned that the agreement would be used to

attack him in Parliament about extending the presence of foreign forces.172 As a result

“the level of political exposure is too great for the limited reward which 400 troops and

five ships can provide”.

423. Mr McDonald told the Inquiry that “one of the features of Iraqi democracy then was,

something supported by the Prime Minister was looked at even more sceptically by the

Iraqi Parliament”.173

424. Prime Minister Maliki told Mr Brown over the telephone that he had been keen

to reach agreement but his Cabinet had been surprised by “demands for additional

elements” in the proposal “including increasing troops to 1,000”.174 The version adopted

by Cabinet would pass through Parliament but the UK’s current proposal would not.

169 Email Catsaras to Brown, 23 May 2009, ‘Iraq: Negotiations on the Defence MOU’.

170 Email Brown to Catsaras, 24 May 2009, ‘Iraq: Negotiations on the Defence MOU’.

171 Letter Catsaras to Ferguson, 26 May 2009, ‘Defence MOU: Prime Minister’s Call with Iraqi Prime

Minister, 26 May’.

172 Email Catsaras to Brown, 26 May 2009, ‘Maliki Briefing’.

173 Public hearing, 5 January 2010, page 41.

174 Letter Catsaras to Ferguson, 26 May 2009, ‘Defence MOU: Prime Minister’s Call with Iraqi Prime

Minister, 26 May’.

453