The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
violence is
directed against the coalition. Once that is excluded, the level of
violence
is very low
compared with many areas in Iraq …
“While
acknowledging serious US concerns we must take the opportunity to
build
momentum
towards Iraqi control …
“There is
no question of us leaving a vacuum in the city, as the IA [Iraqi
Army] and
IPS [Iraqi
Police Service] are already doing patrols and we will remain
present in the
Provincial
Joint Co‑ordination Centre and military transition teams
…”
473.
On the impact
of reducing troop numbers, Mr Browne said:
“The clear
military advice … is that re‑posturing and the associated drawdown
will
not
adversely affect our capacity to provide support to the Iraqi
Security Forces,
including
underwriting it by providing a battlegroup size reserve force. We
must
recognise
that after re‑posturing re‑intervention would not be
straight‑forward but
this is a
nettle that must be grasped at some stage.
“I share
your view that … we need to have carefully considered the
implications both
for
security in Basra … and any knock on effect of the impending
Baghdad initiative.
But I can
assure you that the military advice, as outlined by CDS, is based
on
precisely
this kind of careful consideration …”
“So while
there are inevitable risks and uncertainties I am confident we are
doing our
best to
manage them. And we must also acknowledge that there are risks too
on the
other side
…
“There is
also the risk that if we delay too long … we will inadvertently be
sending a
wrong and
damaging signal on Basra in particular – suggesting that Op SINBAD
has
not worked,
or that we are not making progress against our plans, when in fact
we
are.
Moreover there is a risk that we will appear indecisive at the very
time that we
are
starting to face questions about announcements on troop levels and
equipment
in
Afghanistan.
“These
factors explain why I strongly believe we should make our final
decisions and
announce
them, as soon as possible …”
475.
On 24 January,
Maj Gen Shaw reported:
“On the
re‑posturing plans, whilst Corps is supportive, Casey has tasked
Corps to
conduct a
security review of Basra with the aim of retaining a military
operating base
in Basra
after the US and UK civil delegations have left. I mention this to
illustrate
the extent
to which Casey is not comfortable with our re‑posturing plans
…
“Pressure
for anti‑Iranian activity would seem to be mounting. I am steering
activity
towards
countering the malign Iranian influence (IEDs, weapons etc) but
keeping
88