15.1 | Civilian personnel

428.  Sir Michael informed Mrs Beckett that, in response to the SOSA’s report, he had

asked for another review to look at “the context for our operations in Iraq; our broad

approach to the risks we face; the structures and procedures we have in place to

manage the risks; the extent to which these are being observed in practice; and whether

these satisfy our legal obligations towards our staff”. He hoped that the review would

“enable us to satisfy ourselves that an acceptable basis for continuing our operations

in Iraq remains”.

429.  Sir Michael also advised Mrs Beckett that Mr Patey and Mr Lamb “both rejected

entirely the suggestion that ‘senior staff in our missions are facing undue political

pressure to produce the goods’”. Mr Patey was clear that the advice of professional

security advisers on the ground had never been overruled.

430.  Staff in Basra remained concerned about the unreliability of the Basra air bridge.292

A visiting member of FCO HR Directorate reported that the air bridge was affecting

people’s ability to do their job, “adding to the angst” of decompression breaks and final

departures:

“My own inward journey experience was 27 hours from leaving my hotel in Kuwait to

arriving at Basra Palace with an overnight at Basra Airport. My previous trips by road

to Basra usually took a morning. When I got to … Basra Airport I found that there

were several … staff stuck waiting for a helicopter move – some had been waiting

as long as four days … The US have agreed that we can put staff on their weekly

Chinook flight to/from Kuwait, but there are no guaranteed places …”

431.  On 18 June, a locally engaged (LE) member of staff at the British Embassy Office

Basra was murdered. His wife, also an LE member of staff, was seriously injured.293

432.  The murder raised concerns about the growing threat to local staff.

433.  The FCO and DFID adopted different responses, reflecting the different roles and

work patterns of their local staff.

434.  DFID officials advised Mr Benn that, as a consequence of the murder, DFID’s

single LE member of staff in Basra was staying at home and DFID’s five local

contractors had been advised to avoid the Basra Palace site.294 Further advice would

follow when more information was available from the FCO.

435.  Mr Asquith updated Mrs Beckett on 21 June.295 He reported that the assumption

was that the two LE staff had been targeted because they worked for the British

292  Minute [FCO junior official] to Asquith, 4 July 2006, ‘Visit by HR Manager to Basra 14‑19 June 2006’.

293  eGram 25107/06 Basra to FCO London, 19 June 2006, ‘Basra: Shooting of Consulate General

Local Staff’.

294  Minute [DFID junior officials] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 20 June 2006, ‘Iraq Security Update:

Basra and Baghdad’.

295  Minute Asquith to Private Secretary [FCO], 21 June 2006, ‘Assassination of Locally Engaged Staff

in Basra’.

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