The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
106.
In July 1999,
the JIC changed one of the key assumptions underpinning
previous
assessments,
concluding that some terrorists were no longer reluctant to
cause
mass casualties:
“Over the
1990s there has been a significant increase in the quantity and
quality
of
intelligence that some terrorists are interested in CBRN – and
particularly in
chemical
and biological materials – as weapons. The risk of a CBRN
terrorist
incident
has risen, albeit from a low base. In part this increase reflects
the rise
of Islamic
extremism and ethnic hatred as terrorist motivations: some of
the
terrorists …
are less constrained by considerations such as public
support,
casualties
among innocent bystanders, and the prospect of retaliation. It
may
also reflect
the increasing availability of information about making and using
CB
materials …
[S]ociety’s vulnerability to terrorist attack from CB or
radiological
materials
is high, exacerbated by the lack of a tried and tested CB
counter-terrorist
response in
some countries.”54
107.
In addition,
the JIC assessed that Usama Bin Laden had successfully
acquired
non-conventional
weapons:
“… It has
become clear that Usama Bin Laden has been seeking CBRN
materials …
His wealth
permits him to fund procurement, training and experimentation to
an
extent
unmatched by other terrorists … Given the quantity and quality of
intelligence
about his
interests in CB materials, the length of time he has sought them,
and the
relative
ease with which they can be made, we assess that he has by now
acquired
or made at
least modest quantities of CB materials – even if their exact
nature and
effectiveness
are unclear. The significance of his possession of CB materials
is
that, in
contrast to other terrorists interested in CB, he wishes to target
US, British
and other
interests worldwide. There is also intelligence on training in the
use of
chemicals
as weapons in a terrorist camp in Afghanistan, although it is not
yet clear
if this is
under Bin Laden’s auspices … Bin Laden’s attacks remain more likely
to
employ
conventional weapons than CB materials.”55
108.
The JIC
retained its conclusion that:
“… the
indications of terrorist interest in CBRN materials have yet to be
matched by
a
comparable amount of evidence about possession and intent to use
CBRN. Most
terrorists
continue to favour conventional weapons, as easier to use, more
reliable,
safer and
more controllable than CBRN materials.”56
54
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
119.
55
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
120.
56
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
121.
34