The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
633.
Mr Baker
told the Iraq Strategy Group that it appeared the ruling would
be
accepted by
the Iraqi Government, and that 17 December was therefore still the
target
for
PIC.293
The MCNS
would take the final decision on 9 December.
634.
In relation to
the renewal of resolution 1732, Mr Baker confirmed to the
Iraq
Strategy
Group that “the US were aware of the implications for us of this
being the
last resolution”.
635.
Mr Browne’s
Assistant Private Secretary replied to MOD officials on 26
November
to record
his agreement to the releases requested on 22 November, subject to
it being
assessed
that they no longer posed an “imperative threat” to
security.294
636.
A senior
government official specialising in the Middle East (2),
accompanied by
colleagues,
met JAM1 again on 27 November.295
The purpose
of the meeting was:
•
to show
JAM1 a draft of a possible Basra Agreement/Declaration that
would
precede his
release;
•
to discuss
the progress of other OMS reconciliation talks, particularly with
Gen
Mohan;
•
to resolve
difficulties over specific releases; and
•
to discuss
post-release contact with JAM1.
637.
JAM1’s
reaction to the draft agreement was “neutral” and he agreed to
reflect on
it. His
immediate concern remained one of process: who would organise the
agreement
and who
would sign up as the leaders of Basra?
638.
The officials
visited JAM1 again two days later on 29 November in order to
hear
his
reaction to the draft Declaration, which was positive. The RSG had
also directed
that the
officials should secure endorsement for MND(SE)’s
training/development role
and draw on
that to reach a fuller agreement to future contact. JAM1 considered
that
70-80 percent
of the Najaf leadership would sign up to the sort of MNF
deployment
envisaged.
639.
The record of
the meeting concluded:
“[JAM1]’s
position is, of course, inconsistent, even schizophrenic. He has
supported
our
development and training agenda by deed as well as word; he says
the right
things
about development and governance; he draws a distinction between
the view
of the ‘old
men’ in Najaf: reactionary, anti-development, anti-MNF in any form,
and
293
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 26 November 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group,
5 November’.
Note: the Inquiry believes that the title of this letter refers
incorrectly to a previous meeting of
the
ISG.
294
Letter
APS/Secretary of State [MOD] to AD1 Pol Ops PJHQ, 26 November 2007,
‘Negotiations with
JAM: latest
position’.
295
Email
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (2), 30
November 2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
Meetings with [JAM1] - 27 November and 29 November’.
300