4.2  |  Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

231.  Asked about international support, Mr Blair replied that:

“… people were asking perfectly reasonable questions … but the one thing no one

can deny is that Saddam Hussein is in breach of the United Nations resolutions

on weapons of mass destruction … that that poses a threat not just to the region,

because there is no way, if those weapons are used, that the threat would simply

stay in the region.

“People understand that. Now we have got to make sure that we work out a way

forward that, of course, mobilises the maximum support, but does so on the basis

of removing a threat that the United Nations itself has determined is a threat to the

whole world.”

232.  The British journalists covering the Camp David meeting focused on the

WMD dossier.

233.  The Sunday Express anticipated a “Dossier of Doom”.109

234.  An editorial in the News of the World claimed that the dossier would be “as

devastating as it is vital”. It would show that “evil Saddam has enough chemical and

biological stocks to attack the entire planet, and the missile technology to deliver them”.

It would confirm that he is on the brink of nuclear capability. The editorial concluded:

“We believe Mr Blair CAN convince us a military attack on Iraq is right. We have faith

in our Prime Minister.”110

235.  In their meeting, Mr Blair told President Bush that he was in no doubt about

the need to deal with Saddam Hussein.

236.  Mr Blair also set out the need to build a case to persuade the international

community of the threat posed by Iraq, including the potential for fusion of WMD

and terrorism.

237.  During the discussion with President Bush, Mr Blair set out the need to make a

good public case against Saddam Hussein, publishing all the evidence. The UK would

publish a dossier. He stated that the US and UK:

“… must build our case, persuading the international community of the nature of the

threat. In particular we must get over to our publics the reality that any crisis in the

Gulf generated by Saddam would inevitably involve us.”111

238.  Later Mr Blair stated that there was a need to explain the case for action fully to

public opinion: “While insisting that no-one wanted war, we must spell out why we had

to act.” That included reminding people of the horrors of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

109  Sunday Express, 8 September 2002, PM Sets Out Dossier of Doom.

110  News of the World, 8 September 2002, Blair Will Win The PR Battle.

111 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, ‘Your Visit to Camp David on 7 September:

Conversation with President Bush’.

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