Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
The Committee’s response was one of incredulity, with encouragement to plan for
the worst, as well as the best, case.”
361.  Sir David Manning commented to Mr Bowen, Mr Matthew Rycroft (Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs) and Mr Nicholas Cannon (Mr Blair’s Assistant
Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs):
“Last para[graph] shows scale of problem post-Saddam. We must keep pushing for
this work to be done.”172
Revised UK military campaign objectives
362.  The UK shared its draft military campaign objectives with the US in
mid-February.
363.  Those objectives relating to the post-conflict phase of operations
emphasised the role of the UN and the international community, and the UK’s wish
to withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible.
364.  The objectives made no reference to the UK’s obligations and
responsibilities as an Occupying Power.
365.  There is no indication that the objectives were linked to any assessment
of feasibility or the resources needed for implementation.
366.  Ministers had expressed themselves “generally content” with the draft
objectives in January, but did not have an opportunity collectively to discuss
the issues raised until Mr Blair’s meeting on post-conflict issues on 6 March.
367.  Sir David Manning described the objectives to Dr Rice as compatible with but
not identical to US objectives.
368.  Lord Goldsmith’s approval of the objectives before publication is addressed
in Section 6.2.
369.  On 11 February, Mr Bowen sent Sir David Manning a revised draft of the UK’s
military campaign objectives, incorporating comments from Mr Straw and Whitehall
departments.173 Only DFID offered comments on post-conflict issues.
370.  FCO concerns centred on how to present any reference to regime change.
172 Manuscript comment Manning on Telegram 196 Washington to FCO London, 12 February 2003,
‘Iraq “Day After”: US Makes Initial Planning Public’.
173 Minute Bowen to Manning, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’ attaching
Paper Cabinet Office, February 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Campaign Objectives’.
372
Previous page | Contents | Next page