The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Following
further discussion of the possible options, including that a
conventional land
invasion
was out of the question, Mr Blair repeated that he
was:
“… not
opposed to action against Saddam. But an extremely clever plan
would
be required.”
331.
Mr Blair and
President Bush also discussed Israeli actions.
332.
The record of
the conversation was sent to Mr Straw’s Private Office.
It
was
also sent to Mr Hoon’s Private Secretary, Adm Boyce, Sir
Richard Dearlove,
Sir Stephen Lander
(Director General of the Security Service), Sir Francis
Richards
(Director
of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)), Sir
Christopher
Meyer,
Mr John Scarlett (Chairman of the JIC), Mr McKane, and to Sir
Richard Wilson’s
Private Secretary.
333.
The
following day Mr Blair sent President Bush a paper setting out
proposals
for Phase 2
of the war against terrorism.
334.
In relation
to Iraq, Mr Blair stated that it was a threat because: it had a
WMD
capability;
was acquiring more; had shown its willingness to use it; could
export
that
capability; and was in breach of UN Security Council
resolutions.
335.
Mr Blair
suggested a strategy for regime change in Iraq that would build
over
time which
would permit military action to be taken “if necessary, without
losing
international
support”.
336.
Mr Blair sent
President Bush a paper ‘The War against Terrorism: The
Second
337.
The paper
comprised an overview of the possible approaches to potential
terrorist
threats in
seven countries160
and a
‘Strategy for Confronting Islamic Extremism’ in
moderate
Muslim states.
338.
In relation to
Iraq, the key points were:
•
Iraq was a
threat because: “it has WMD capability; is acquiring more; has
shown
its
willingness to use it; and can export that capability”. Iraq was in
breach of
UN Security
Council resolutions 687 (1991), 715 (1991) and 1284 (1999)
and
Saddam
Hussein supported certain Palestinian terrorist groups and used
terror
tactics
against Iraqi dissidents.
•
Any link to
11 September and AQ was “at best very tenuous”.
•
Although
“people want to be rid of Saddam”, international opinion “outside
the
US/UK”
would “at present” be “reluctant” to support immediate military
action.
159
Paper Blair
[to Bush], 4 December 2001, ‘The War Against Terrorism: The Second
Phase’.
160
Indonesia,
Iran, Iraq, Philippines, Somalia, Syria and Yemen.
368