The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The CFLCC
plan for Phase IV, known as Eclipse II, was the product of the
post-conflict
planning
effort led by (acting) Major General Albert Whitley, CFLCC Deputy
Commanding
General
(Post Hostilities). Eclipse II had close links to CFLCC’s combat
operations
planning,
but not to broader Washington policy debates.424
After
Saddam, the 2008
RAND report for the US Army on US post-conflict planning,
stated
that
Eclipse II had been through 15 revisions by the middle of March
2003, with the final
draft
released on 12 April.425
The RAND
report concluded that CFLCC “was gaining a realistic appraisal of
the
potential
security challenges that would confront Coalition forces”, but
failed to challenge
military
planning assumptions, including the degree to which the remnants of
the Iraqi
Government
would provide essential services and security.
In his
written statement to the Inquiry, Maj Gen Whitley explained that
Eclipse II was
named after
the 1945 US plan for post-war Germany.426
It was “an
attempt to produce
some
coherence for the military aspects of Post Hostilities and give
subordinate
commands,
responsibilities, direction and tasks”. The “tiny” planning team in
ORHA
produced
the civil mirror image.
Maj Gen
Whitley judged that the plan had “some local practical effect”, but
was
“inadequate”.
989.
On 11
March, at the height of the UK’s effort to secure Security
Council
backing for
a second resolution (see Section 3.8), Mr Straw advised
Mr Blair of
the need
for a “Plan B” for the military in the event that the Government
failed to
secure a
majority in the Parliamentary Labour Party for military
action.
990.
Mr Straw’s
Plan B envisaged the UK “taking responsibility for a
sector
and for
humanitarian and reconstruction work” in order to make “a major
UK
contribution
to the overall campaign” without being directly involved in
the
invasion.
991.
At that
stage, officials were still pressing, without success, for
Ministers to
agree draft
objectives for post-conflict Iraq and principles to guide
short-term UK
involvement
that could be shared with the US.
992.
It is not
clear whether Mr Straw had discussed the feasibility of his
idea with
others.
993.
On 11 March,
Mr Straw advised Mr Blair that he should not go to
Parliament
seeking
approval for military action unless he could be sure of a majority
in the
424
Dale
C. Operation
Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results and Issues for
Congress.
Congressional
Research Service, 15 December 2008.
425
Bensahel N,
Oliker O, Crane K, Brennan RR Jr, Gregg HS, Sullivan T &
Rathmell A. After
Saddam:
Prewar
Planning and the Occupation of Iraq. RAND
Corporation, 2008.
426
Statement,
25 January 2011, page 12.
490