The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
138.
In August
2006, ACM Stirrup was asked to give direction on both seeking US
help
for Op
SALAMANCA and the possibility of deploying UK forces to support US
operations
outside
MND(SE).
139.
While ACM
Stirrup stressed the importance of senior Iraqi political
support
if
Op SALAMANCA was to be a success, Lieutenant General Nicholas
Houghton,
the Senior
British Military Representative – Iraq, indicated a concern that
even with
US support
the capabilities available in MND(SE) might not be sufficient
successfully
to deliver
Op SALAMANCA.
140.
ACM Stirrup
directed that it was acceptable for the UK to make use of
US
enablers,
such as aviation, in MND(SE), but that, in general, commitments in
MND(SE)
were to be
met by existing MND(SE) personnel (including contractors) and any
shortfalls
were to be
identified and considered appropriately.
141.
ACM Stirrup
also directed that the deployment of UK troops to
Multi-National
Division
(Centre South):
“… crossed
a clear policy ‘red line’ and seemed counter-intuitive, given
that
consideration
was also being given to obtaining US forces for MND(SE). The
UK
needed to
draw down its force levels as soon as practicable, both in
MND(SE)
142.
The decision
not to allow the use of US support in Basra was an important
one.
The Inquiry
considers that the question of what was needed to make Op
SALAMANCA
a success
should have been addressed directly by ACM Stirrup, whose response
instead
precluded
proper consideration of whether additional UK resources would
be required.
143.
There was
continuing resistance to any suggestion that UK forces
should
operate
outside MND(SE) and there may have been concern that US
participation in
Op
SALAMANCA would have led to an obligation on the UK to engage more
outside
MND(SE).
This might not, as ACM Stirrup observed, be consistent with a
commitment
to drawdown,
but might have reduced the risk of strategic failure.
144.
The nature of
Op SALAMANCA was constrained by the Iraqi Government
in
September
2006, so that the eventual operation (renamed Operation SINBAD)
left
“Basra in
the hands of the militant militia and death squads, with the ISF
unable to
impose, let
alone maintain, the rule of law”.46
This
contributed to the conditions which
led the
UK into negotiations with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in early
2007.
145.
Attempts were
subsequently made to present Op SINBAD as equivalent to
the
2007 US
surge. Although there was some resemblance between the “Clear,
Hold, Build”
tactics to
be used by US surge forces and the UK’s tactics for Op SINBAD, the
UK
operation
did not deploy sufficient additional resources to conduct “Hold”
and “Build”
45
Minutes, 2
August 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
46
Minute
Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update –
21 September 2006’.
494