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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
138.  In August 2006, ACM Stirrup was asked to give direction on both seeking US help
for Op SALAMANCA and the possibility of deploying UK forces to support US operations
outside MND(SE).
139.  While ACM Stirrup stressed the importance of senior Iraqi political support
if Op SALAMANCA was to be a success, Lieutenant General Nicholas Houghton,
the Senior British Military Representative – Iraq, indicated a concern that even with
US support the capabilities available in MND(SE) might not be sufficient successfully
to deliver Op SALAMANCA.
140.  ACM Stirrup directed that it was acceptable for the UK to make use of US
enablers, such as aviation, in MND(SE), but that, in general, commitments in MND(SE)
were to be met by existing MND(SE) personnel (including contractors) and any shortfalls
were to be identified and considered appropriately.
141.  ACM Stirrup also directed that the deployment of UK troops to Multi-National
Division (Centre South):
“… crossed a clear policy ‘red line’ and seemed counter-intuitive, given that
consideration was also being given to obtaining US forces for MND(SE). The UK
needed to draw down its force levels as soon as practicable, both in MND(SE)
and elsewhere.”45
142.  The decision not to allow the use of US support in Basra was an important one.
The Inquiry considers that the question of what was needed to make Op SALAMANCA
a success should have been addressed directly by ACM Stirrup, whose response instead
precluded proper consideration of whether additional UK resources would be required.
143.  There was continuing resistance to any suggestion that UK forces should
operate outside MND(SE) and there may have been concern that US participation in
Op SALAMANCA would have led to an obligation on the UK to engage more outside
MND(SE). This might not, as ACM Stirrup observed, be consistent with a commitment
to drawdown, but might have reduced the risk of strategic failure.
144.  The nature of Op SALAMANCA was constrained by the Iraqi Government in
September 2006, so that the eventual operation (renamed Operation SINBAD) left
“Basra in the hands of the militant militia and death squads, with the ISF unable to
impose, let alone maintain, the rule of law”.46 This contributed to the conditions which
led the UK into negotiations with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in early 2007.
145.  Attempts were subsequently made to present Op SINBAD as equivalent to the
2007 US surge. Although there was some resemblance between the “Clear, Hold, Build”
tactics to be used by US surge forces and the UK’s tactics for Op SINBAD, the UK
operation did not deploy sufficient additional resources to conduct “Hold” and “Build”
45  Minutes, 2 August 2006, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
46  Minute Shirreff, 21 September 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21 September 2006’.
494
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