9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
711.
During the
visit, ACM Stirrup was briefed by Gen Casey on his updated
campaign
plan, which
included a reduction from 14 US brigades to 10 by the end of 2005
and five
by the end
of 2007, subject to successful build-up of the Iraqi Security
Forces.
712.
Despite the
growing problems in Basra, ACM Stirrup judged that there
was:
“… no logic
for precipitate change in our military plans. Indeed there are
compelling
reasons why
security handover remains the right strategy. Militarily, in Maysan
and
Muthanna
the Iraqi Security Forces are ready, and there is political
appetite. And
progress in
those provinces will set the conditions for Basra, which is the
key. The
obstacles
there are: 1) militias, and 2) governance. Neither is substantially
in our
hands, and
we need firm action by the government in Baghdad. But as
consent
continues
to reduce (as we have always foreseen it would), so too does our
ability to
effect
further (significant) improvement. The law of diminishing returns
is now firmly
in play,
and there is an increasing risk that we become part of the problem,
rather
than of the
solution. So, for these reasons and for reasons of momentum, I
judge
that we
should press on …”
713.
ACM Stirrup
visited Afghanistan as part of the same trip, and
concluded:
“… the main
similarity between both theatres is that, whilst we will
continue
militarily
to hold the ring as best we can, ultimate success can only be
delivered by
non‑military
instruments of government, be they UK, international or
indigenous.
But it is
the contrasts between the two campaigns that struck me most. In
Iraq, our
forces sit
within a well found and well organised US-led force, with immense
combat
power,
effective command and control, coherent political oversight (in the
form of the
US and UK
embassies), and a coalition comprised of countries that … are
prepared
to accept
the costs, in blood and treasure, of operations in Iraq. This is
just as well
for the
coalition is viewed popularly as a force of occupation, suffers
inexorably
declining
levels of popular consent, and faces a multi-faceted, but
sophisticated and
dangerous
enemy.”
714.
ACM Stirrup
contrasted circumstances in Iraq with the situation in
Afghanistan
where the
UK position in Helmand was “sound – indeed exemplary” but it was
positioned
within a
NATO force with insufficient combat power and a difficult command
and control
structure.
He asked:
“So what?
In Iraq, we are in clear ‘law of diminishing returns’ territory.
Even if we
were
invited to stay (which looks improbable) it is difficult to see
what military
advantage
might flow from our remaining in any significant numbers beyond
2007.
That said,
the security picture, particularly in Basra but also in Maysan, may
not
look at all
appetising as we pull out, and astute conditioning of the UK public
may be
necessary
if we are to avoid the charge of strategic failure. In Afghanistan,
we face
immediate
opportunity, tempered by uncertainty …
605