3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
103.
With
President Bush, Mr Blair emphasised the need for the
inspectors
to return
to test Saddam Hussein’s intentions.
104.
On 21
September, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed the
difficulties if the
resolution
was too weak and Saddam Hussein outwitted the inspectors so that
when
they
returned they found nothing.29
They also
discussed the need for the draft resolution
to be
divided into two: a strong resolution concentrating on WMD – the
toughest regime
possible –
and a second on non‑disarmament issues.
105.
Mr Blair
argued that if Saddam Hussein “messed about with the inspectors,
we
must be
ready to pull them out and take the appropriate steps. This was not
going to
be a
re‑run of UNSCOM.” It was likely that “Saddam would get up to his
old tricks pretty
quickly”.
But “for the moment we must insist that we wanted to make
inspections work
so that
we could disarm Saddam”.
106.
Mr Blair
agreed the need for a quick resolution and the rapid return of
inspectors.
They could
not wait for another year for the inspectors to do their
work.
107.
Mr Campbell
recorded that Mr Blair had had to “work on” President Bush in
a
conversation
that had lasted 30 minutes because the US was “going down an
impossible
road again,
basically a route that was unsellable”. No.10 was “worried that
Rumsfeld
[Mr Donald
Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense] and Cheney [Mr Dick Cheney,
US Vice
President]
were pushing for the idea that we get in conditions that we know
Iraq could
108.
The record of
the discussion between President Bush and Mr Blair
on 21 September
(and
records of other discussions) confirms those
comments.31
109.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw eventually agreed on 23 September that the time
had
come to
test the negotiability of the US position with France and Russia.
They
also agreed
a negotiating strategy which asked for more than the UK
thought
could be
agreed.
110.
Mr Blair
and Mr Straw discussed the content of the revised draft
resolution on
23 September.32
They agreed
that there were dangers with a proposal for a full, final
and
complete
declaration of Iraq’s capabilities but the time had come to test
its negotiability
with France
and Russia.
111.
Mr Blair
agreed that Mr Straw should tell Secretary Powell that, while
he
understood
the US anxieties about whether the UN would deal effectively with
the Iraqi
29
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 21 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation between
the Prime Minister and
President
Bush’.
30
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
31
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 21 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation between
the Prime Minister and
President
Bush’.
32
Letter
Rycroft to Sedwill, 23 September 2002, ‘Iraq: UN
Resolution’.
217