Executive
Summary
135.
Following
Iraq’s submission of the declaration on its chemical, biological,
nuclear
and
ballistic missile programmes to the UN on 7 December, and before
the inspectors
had
properly begun their task, the US concluded that Saddam Hussein was
not going
to take
the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 to comply with his
obligations.
136.
Mr Blair
was advised on 11 December that there was impatience in the
US
Administration
and it was looking at military action as early as mid‑February
2003.44
137.
Mr Blair
told President Bush on 16 December that the Iraqi declaration
was
“patently
false”.45
He was
“cautiously optimistic” that the inspectors would find
proof.
138.
In a statement
issued on 18 December, Mr Straw said that Saddam Hussein
had
decided to
continue the pretence that Iraq had no WMD programme. If he
persisted
“in this
obvious falsehood” it would become clear that he had “rejected the
pathway
139.
The JIC’s
initial Assessment of the Iraqi declaration on 18 December
stated
that there
had been “No serious attempt” to answer any of the unresolved
questions
highlighted
by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) or to refute any of the
points
made in the
UK dossier on Iraq’s WMD programme.47
140.
President Bush
is reported to have told a meeting of the US National
Security
Council on
18 December 2002, at which the US response to Iraq’s
declaration
was discussed,
that the point of the 7 December declaration was to test
whether
Saddam
Hussein would accept the “final opportunity” for peace offered by
the Security
Council.48
He had summed
up the discussion by stating:
“We’ve got
what we need now, to show America that Saddam won’t disarm
himself.”
141.
Mr Colin
Powell, the US Secretary of State, stated on 19 December that Iraq
was
“well on
its way to losing its last chance”, and that there was a “practical
limit” to how
long the
inspectors could be given to complete their work.49
142.
Mr Straw
told Secretary Powell on 30 December that the US and UK
should
develop a
clear “plan B” postponing military action on the basis that
inspections plus
the threat
of force were containing Saddam Hussein.50
44
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 11 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.
45
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 16 December 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Telephone
Call with President Bush,
16
December’.
46
The
National Archives, 18 December 2002, Statement
by Foreign Secretary on Iraq Declaration.
47
JIC
Assessment, 18 December 2002, ‘An Initial Assessment of Iraq’s WMD
Declaration’.
48
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on
Terrorism. HarperCollins,
2008.
49
US
Department of State Press Release, Press
Conference Secretary of State Colin L Powell,
Washington, 19
December 2002.
50
Letter
Straw to Manning, 30 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Colin
Powell, 30 December’.
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