10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
18.
Section 6.5
addresses the UK’s pre-invasion preparations, led by DFID and
the
military,
for the provision of humanitarian assistance during and in the
immediate
aftermath
of conflict.
19.
Ms Clare
Short, the International Development Secretary, described
DFID’s
humanitarian
contingency plan in a Written Ministerial Statement to Parliament
on
20.
In the
Statement, Ms Short stated that DFID would have two roles in the
event
of conflict:
•
to help
advise UK Armed Forces on their obligations under the Hague
and
Geneva
Conventions; and
•
to use the
funds, expertise and influence available to it to support
delivery
of humanitarian
assistance by the international community.
21.
Ms Short
advised that DFID was deploying staff to key locations in the
region, had
brought
DFID’s stockpile of non-food items, vehicles and equipment “to
immediate
readiness”,
was procuring additional supplies, and was positioning some of its
stocks
in Kuwait
and elsewhere in the region.
22.
On 17 March,
at Ms Short’s request, DFID’s Conflict and Humanitarian
Affairs
Department
(CHAD) prepared a paper on shortcomings in humanitarian
preparations
and steps
needed to address them.5
23.
Officials
identified seven problems:
•
“UN funding
needs insufficiently met. Preparedness incomplete …
•
Red Cross
Movement preparing but requires substantial funding support
…
•
NGOs
[Non-Governmental Organisations] beginning to establish presence
but
not fully
prepared …
•
US
preparedness for response lacks local experience and based on
optimistic
assumptions
…
•
How to
maintain the Oil-for-Food (OFF) programme …
•
How to
support humanitarian agencies [to] gain early access to Iraq
…
•
How
Coalition Forces can provide effective humanitarian response
…”
4
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 13 March
2003, column 21WS.
5
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID],
17 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Humanitarian
Assistance’ attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Iraq: What is lacking in
terms of being prepared for
an
effective humanitarian response and what would it take to address
that?’.
7