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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
205.  The IPU also welcomed news that the CPA Strategic Plan (‘The Vision for Iraq’)
was almost ready for publication, and told Mr Sawers that they thought it had been “lost
in the weeds”.81 The IPU’s view was that the document required “some more work …
and clarity”.
206.  On 8 July, Mr Blair gave evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee.82
207.  Mr Blair told the Committee that “the fact that we will probably have a political
council up and running within the next few weeks, indicates that there is change and
progress being made”.83
208.  In response to a question from Mr Edward Leigh, the Committee Chairman, about
his exit strategy for Iraq, Mr Blair replied:
“We stay until we get the job done. The job is to get the country back on its feet, to
give it a proper functioning political system which means that the Iraqis themselves
in a representative way control their country and to make sure that it has the ability
to be a stable and prosperous partner in the region.”84
209.  Mr Blair also told the Committee that:
“The British troop requirement … is already just under a third of what it was at the
height of the conflict, so we are not at the same troop strength as we were even two
months ago.”
210.  On 9 July, Cabinet Office officials briefed members of the AHMGIR that:
“A Governing Council should be established within the next two weeks. The
Council is likely to meet our core requirements: it will emerge by consensus among
leading Iraqis; the main ethnic and religious groups will be represented in a balanced
way; at least 4-5 women will be involved … and it will have UN consent.”85
211.  The same Annotated Agenda also reported the CPA’s announcement of a new
Dinar note, a 1:1 replacement for the Saddam Dinar, Iraq’s pre-conflict currency.86
But there were signs that the CPA’s failure to consult had not been resolved.
Cabinet Office officials reported:
“Bremer has also announced the independence of the Iraqi Central Bank …
the announcement has taken all by surprise. It is not clear if De Mello was fully
consulted … We are trying to clarify the situation.”
81  Telegram 27 FCO London to IraqRep, 7 July 2003, ‘Iraq Priorities’.
82  The Liaison Committee is appointed to consider general matters relating to the work of select
committees and, amongst other duties, to hear evidence from the Prime Minister on matters of
public policy.
83  House of Commons, Select Committee on Liaison, Minutes of Evidence, 8 July 2003, Q168.
84  House of Commons, Select Committee on Liaison, Minutes of Evidence, 8 July 2003, Qs189-191.
85 Annotated Agenda, 10 July 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
86  The conversation rate was 150:1 for the Old Dinar (or Swiss Dinar) used in the Kurdish north.
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