9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
452.
President Bush
set out his strategy for Iraq in a speech to the US Naval
Academy
in
Annapolis on 30 November.212
453.
The British
Embassy Washington commented that he had invoked the spirit
of
Churchill
and Roosevelt: the US objective in Iraq was “nothing less than
complete
victory”.
He had acknowledged the validity of debate but said that an
“artificial timetable”
would be
wrong. President Bush had anticipated US troop reductions as Iraqi
forces
stood up,
but had avoided timelines.
454.
In parallel
with the President’s speech, the National Security Council
published its
“National
Strategy for Victory in Iraq”.213
455.
The strategy
set out three stages of victory in Iraq:
“– Short
term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists,
meeting political
milestones,
building democratic institutions, and standing up security
forces.
– Medium
term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its
own security,
with a
fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to
achieving its
economic
potential.
– Longer
term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated
into the
international
community, and a full partner in the global war on
terrorism.”
456.
The strategy
was “conditions based” and did not set a date by which it would
be
achieved
because:
“No war has
ever been won on a timetable and neither will this
one.”
457.
The strategy
said that US force posture would change with conditions in
Iraq.
It was
expected that some changes in posture would take place over the
following year
“as the
political process advances and Iraqi security forces grow and gain
experience”.
458.
At the FCO’s
request, the JIC considered the relationship between Iran and
Iraq
459.
The Assessment
reiterated earlier JIC judgements that the Iranian
leadership
aspired
to:
“… help
create a stable and unified Iraq which is Shia-led with a strong
Islamic
identity;
open to Iranian political and commercial influence; unable to pose
a
military
threat and inclined to defer to Iran over issues of mutual
interest; and free of
significant
Western influence.”
212
eGram
19675/05 Washington to FCO London, 1 December 2005, ‘Iraq/US:
Bush’s speech and the
public
debate’.
213
National
Security Council, November 2005, ‘National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq’.
214
JIC
Assessment, 30 November 2005, ‘Iran and Iraq’.
565