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3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
154.  Mr Campbell commented:
“It was a pretty good discussion, though focused as much as anything on the idea
that we were having to deal with a mad America and TB [Mr Blair] keeping them
on the straight and narrow. JP [John Prescott] referred to the idea that TB would
have sleepless nights, that we knew it could go to a difficult choice between the
US and the UN.”
155.  Mr Campbell added that the discussion had been “serious and sober and
hard‑headed and TB was in control of all the arguments”: “Funnily enough, I think
TB won the Cabinet over more easily than the public.”
156.  In his memoir published after the conflict, Mr Robin Cook, Leader of the House
of Commons, June 2001 to March 2003, wrote that only he and Ms Short had “openly
questioned the wisdom of military action”.47 Ms Short had concluded that it was an unjust
war. Mr Cook wrote that for him “the most difficult question was ‘Why now?’. What had
happened in the past year to make Saddam Hussein more of an imminent danger than
he has been any year in the past decade?” Mr Hoon’s attempt to answer that question
by reference to the attack on 11 September 2001 had, in Mr Cook’s view, “only served
to confirm the difficulty of the question” as “no one has a shred of evidence that Saddam
Hussein was involved” in that attack.
157.  Mr Cook wrote that he had closed his contribution:
“… by stressing the vital importance of getting approval for anything we do through
the UN. ‘What follows after Saddam will be the mother of all nation building
projects. We shouldn’t attempt it on our own – if we want the rest of the international
community with us at the end, we need them in at the start.’”
158.  Mr Cook also wrote that in summing up the meeting, Mr Blair had:
“… put rather more stress on the US than the UN. ‘To carry on being engaged with
the US is vital. The voices on both the left and right who want to pull Europe and
the US apart would have a disastrous consequence if they succeeded.’”
159.  Lord Turnbull, Cabinet Secretary from September 2002 to September 2005,
described Cabinet on 23 September as an “important meeting”; the members:
“… weren’t simply listening … They were actually applying their political judgement
and – for the most part supportively, in the direction that the Prime Minister wanted.
“… the only dissension was Robin Cook … Everyone else accepted … that
containment wasn’t working and he was the one person to say he thought it was,
and I am sorry he isn’t around to take the credit for that …”48
47 Cook R. The Point of Departure. Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 2003.
48 Public hearing, 13 January 2010, page 49.
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