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3.6  |  Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003
Iraq could try to overload UNMOVIC by releasing large volumes of information
about legitimate industries. Although less likely, Iraq might admit to some
‘expendable’ parts of its WMD programmes to demonstrate ostensible
co‑operation and to provoke divisions in the UN. But it will focus on concealing
sensitive items from inspectors.
There is no real evidence as yet of real cracks within the regime, but these might
appear if UNMOVIC makes real progress. But loyalty within the Iraq military or
security apparatus is unlikely to collapse until an overwhelming Coalition attack
is seen as inevitable or actually begins. And regime breakdown cannot be
guaranteed short of a major ground invasion.
If Saddam were to perceive a large‑scale Coalition attack to be inevitable, he
would probably cease any co‑operation with the UN and become far more
confrontational.
Saddam’s total control means that Iraqi policy can change substantially with
little warning. There is considerable scope for Saddam to miscalculate or
react unpredictably.”7
26.  Other important points made in the Assessment were:
The agreement of “new, tougher rights for inspectors” in resolution 1441 had
been “an unwelcome surprise to the Iraqi leadership”.
“Regime survival” was Saddam Hussein’s “overriding priority”. But he also “had
a very strong commitment to retaining WMD” which he saw as “key to Iraq’s
power and influence”.
Iraq’s security apparatus was “designed to prevent internal rebellion”.
Top officials already associated “their fate with that of the regime, fearing
retribution from the Iraqi population, or the Coalition”.
Regime concerns about internal security were “focused on southern Iraq” but the
JIC continued to judge that “an internal uprising would be unable to overthrow
Saddam except in conjunction with a large‑scale external attack”.
Iraq had “no credible alternative to ostensible co‑operation with the UN” and it
could “only continue playing for time in the hope that the international pressure
it faces eventually weakens”. Saddam Hussein would “avoid extreme actions,
at least in the short term”.
The JIC had “no new intelligence” on whether Iraq would “declare any
prohibited materials or activity in response” to resolution 1441. Any disclosures
on WMD would “damage the regime’s already limited credibility, given its
continuing blanket denials of WMD possession”. The Iraqi regime would “seek
to take advantage of any opportunity to fudge Iraq’s obligations or delay the
UN process”.
7  JIC Assessment, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime Cohesion Under Pressure’.
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